{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1098.002","id":"T1098.002","name":"Additional Email Delegate Permissions","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"a81bc8c80a1aaf9fa676aa6b412703250b91e40bff0e2d4d96e8da6dec65d113","description":"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe) \n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002","external_id":"T1098.002"},{"source_name":"Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019","description":"Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365/128744511"},{"source_name":"Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018","description":"Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/"},{"source_name":"Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe","description":"Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html"},{"source_name":"Gmail Delegation","description":"Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en"},{"source_name":"FireEye APT35 2018","description":"Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://static.carahsoft.com/concrete/files/1015/2779/3571/M-Trends-2018-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper","description":"Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452"},{"source_name":"Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps"}],"platforms":["Windows","Office Suite"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1098","id":"T1098","name":"Account Manipulation","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["persistence","privilege-escalation"],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","identity","network-infrastructure","onprem","saas","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1098/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls","some_candidates_require_elevation"],"telemetry_tags":["Active Directory Object Modification","File Modification","Process Creation","User Account Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0066","name":"Active Directory Object Modification","tag":"Active Directory Object Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0066/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","tag":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1098/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":31,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":6,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Edge Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#69-edge-anomaly"},{"title":"Graph-Evolution Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#75-graph-evolution-anomaly"},{"title":"Graph-Path-Length Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#74-graph-path-length-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Edge Anomaly","Graph-Evolution Anomaly","Graph-Path-Length Anomaly"],"tool_tags":["Mimikatz"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0002","name":"Mimikatz","page":"tools/S0002/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":17,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Modification of an account attribute, policy or enabled state.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit User Account Management and retain the changed attributes and target account; correlate approved administrative requests.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["target_account","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0010","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target_account":"lab-temp","attribute":"enabled","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1098.002","id":"T1098.002","name":"Additional Email Delegate Permissions","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows","Office Suite"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1098.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1098.002/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0373","name":"Detection Strategy for Addition of Email Delegate Permissions","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--679edb0f-4fa0-4929-9ffd-881d9f82263d","relationship_id":"relationship--9520178c-83f2-495e-84ef-d1f6205d34b0","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1051","name":"Analytic 1051","guidance":"Detection of anomalous or unauthorized mailbox delegation activity (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission, Default/Anonymous mailbox permissions, Gmail delegation setup).","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373#AN1051","platforms":["Office Suite"],"tuning":[{"field":"DelegatePermissionLevel","description":"Threshold for unexpected delegate roles such as FullAccess or SendAs."},{"field":"FolderTargetScope","description":"Mailbox folder targeted by delegation (Inbox, Root, Calendar, etc.)."},{"field":"DelegatorToDelegatePairing","description":"Pairings of delegate and delegator users that are expected."},{"field":"MailflowAnomalyThreshold","description":"Spike in outbound mail after delegate addition, used to catch phishing or mass exfil."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0010","component":"User Account Modification","name":"m365:unified","channel":"Add-MailboxPermission, UpdateFolderPermissions","platforms":["Office Suite"],"analytic_id":"AN1051","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373#AN1051","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0010/"}]},{"id":"AN1052","name":"Analytic 1052","guidance":"Execution of PowerShell commands that modify mailbox permissions using Exchange cmdlets (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission), often tied to BEC or post-compromise persistence.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373#AN1052","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"PowerShellCmdletFilter","description":"Exchange cmdlets to include or exclude based on scope (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission)."},{"field":"ExecutionParent","description":"Flag suspicious script or interactive shell launch by non-admins."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Window in which Add-MailboxPermission is followed by anomalous usage (e.g., SendAs events)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4688","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1052","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373#AN1052","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"m365:unified","channel":"PowerShell: Add-MailboxPermission","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1052","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0373#AN1052","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","tag":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1098","id":"T1098","name":"Account Manipulation","page":"detections/enterprise/T1098/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the <code>ApplicationImpersonation</code> role to a compromised account.(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c75b8dfa-5980-4686-9d74-b0c92ce60274","references":[{"source_name":"Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021","description":"NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF"}]},{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with `ApplicationImpersonation` rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes; [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) has also used compromised accounts holding `ApplicationImpersonation` rights in Exchange to collect emails.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)","relationship_id":"relationship--d9fca287-fe50-43f8-bf6d-da6751ef8009","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022","description":"Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft"},{"source_name":"Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22","description":"Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"}]},{"id":"G0059","name":"Magic Hound","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on Middle East organizations.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) ","relationship_id":"relationship--7e636340-8b64-4913-be75-a8e62f68fc91","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT35 2018","description":"Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://static.carahsoft.com/concrete/files/1015/2779/3571/M-Trends-2018-Report.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.","relationship_id":"relationship--53c22ca9-b02f-4a45-adc6-cf7763a2c6a9","references":[]},{"id":"M1032","name":"Multi-factor Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.","relationship_id":"relationship--e65ad45a-4862-4455-8d3c-454eb78deaeb","references":[]},{"id":"M1042","name":"Disable or Remove Feature or Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042","kind":"course-of-action","description":"If email delegation is not required, disable it. In Google Workspace this can be accomplished through the Google Admin console.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)","relationship_id":"relationship--f212430d-160e-4676-b541-8a7cb818fe6f","references":[{"source_name":"Gmail Delegation","description":"Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1059.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1059.001/","T1098.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1098.003/","T1534":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1534/","T1098.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1098.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1098.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0010","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target_account":"lab-temp","attribute":"enabled","before":false,"after":true}}]}}
