{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1090.003","id":"T1090.003","name":"Multi-hop Proxy","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"f852430b7518d0fa57171085782ca1b00312e95e5ec520f3135c5ebc62af5b18","description":"Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.(Citation: ORB Mandiant) \n\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003","external_id":"T1090.003"},{"source_name":"ORB Mandiant","description":"Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks"},{"source_name":"NGLite Trojan","description":"Robert Falcone, Jeff White, and Peter Renals. (2021, November 7). Targeted Attack Campaign Against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Delivers Godzilla Webshells, NGLite Trojan and KdcSponge Stealer. Retrieved February 8, 2024.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/"},{"source_name":"Onion Routing","description":"Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing"}],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1090","id":"T1090","name":"Proxy","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["command-and-control"],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1090/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","Firewall Rule Modification","Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Flow","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","tag":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1090/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":21,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["FRP","HTRAN","netsh","ngrok","PoshC2","QuasarRAT","Remcos"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S1144","name":"FRP","page":"tools/S1144/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0040","name":"HTRAN","page":"tools/S0040/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0108","name":"netsh","page":"tools/S0108/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0508","name":"ngrok","page":"tools/S0508/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0378","name":"PoshC2","page":"tools/S0378/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0262","name":"QuasarRAT","page":"tools/S0262/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","page":"tools/S0332/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Changes to firmware state or a firmware update observation on a device.","collection_focus":"Collect approved OEM firmware inventory/update audit and compare version or measured hashes against a known baseline. Use read-only vendor-supported interfaces.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","firmware_before","firmware_after","change_ticket"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1090.003","id":"T1090.003","name":"Multi-hop Proxy","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1090.003/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1090.003/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":3,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2","title":"Query Tor Onion Address - DNS Client","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","service":"dns-client","definition":"Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events."},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/builtin/dns_client/win_dns_client_tor_onion.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544","title":"DNS Query Tor .Onion Address - Sysmon","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"dns_query"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_tor_onion_domain_query.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c","title":"Tor Client/Browser Execution","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_tor_execution.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0359","name":"Multi-hop Proxy Behavior via Relay Node Chaining, Onion Routing, and Network Tunneling","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--407286ed-c904-412a-9f2d-7426ea7304a4","relationship_id":"relationship--393a41c9-3c31-4325-9af0-c7601db3cc77","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1020","name":"Analytic 1020","guidance":"Suspicious processes (e.g., Tor clients, relays, unknown binaries) launch with sustained encrypted outbound traffic to known anonymity infrastructure (e.g., Tor, I2P), and may relay to additional internal systems via reverse proxying, ICMP tunneling, or socket forwarding.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1020","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"DomainCategory","description":"Can be tuned to `.onion`, I2P, or suspicious CDN domains."},{"field":"ProcessParent","description":"Detect known-good vs. abnormal launching binaries (e.g., mshta spawning Tor)."},{"field":"ConnectionDuration","description":"Threshold for persistent connections over known relay ports (e.g., 9050)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1020","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1020","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1020","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1020","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"dns:query","channel":"Outbound resolution to hidden service domains (e.g., `.onion`)","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1020","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1020","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1021","name":"Analytic 1021","guidance":"Tools such as `tor`, `nglite`, `proxychains`, `chisel`, or custom daemons repeatedly initiate outbound sessions to multiple nodes before final destination. This behavior is abnormal for Linux services outside of VPN, monitoring, or CDN relay contexts.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1021","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ExecutablePath","description":"Match known proxy tools, tuned for environment."},{"field":"RelayCount","description":"Detect outbound chaining behavior through >2 IPs in short succession."},{"field":"ProtocolType","description":"Allow filtering by ICMP, TCP/443, UDP for obfuscation channels."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve for proxy tools","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1021","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1021","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"conn.log + ssl.log with Tor fingerprinting","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1021","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1021","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"Netfilter/iptables","channel":"Forwarded packets log","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1021","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1021","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN1022","name":"Analytic 1022","guidance":"LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons initiate persistent Tor or relay processes that make encrypted outbound connections. May be paired with sandbox bypasses or unsigned executables communicating over SOCKS proxies.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1022","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"LaunchdLabel","description":"Regex for masking patterns in LaunchAgents with proxy behavior."},{"field":"UnsignedBinary","description":"Allow for exceptions for known unsigned binaries."},{"field":"SOCKSPortUsage","description":"Monitor local 9050/9150 activity and rerouted system traffic."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"process, socket, and DNS logs","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1022","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1022","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"process_events + launchd","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1022","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1022","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"forwarded encrypted traffic","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1022","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1022","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1023","name":"Analytic 1023","guidance":"Outbound encrypted traffic initiated from hypervisor shell or via VM backdoor mechanisms to relays in VPS infrastructure, especially if traversing multiple nodes before reaching Internet destination. Packet captures or firewall logs show non-VM communication paths.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1023","platforms":["ESXi"],"tuning":[{"field":"HopCount","description":"Threshold on number of IPs contacted in sequence without DNS resolution."},{"field":"ShellAccess","description":"Flag if relay communication initiated by ESXi shell or unknown VM agent."},{"field":"VPSIPRange","description":"Filter for known Tor/VPS egress networks."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"esxi:esxupdate","channel":"/var/log/esxupdate.log or /var/log/vmksummary.log","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1023","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1023","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"esxi:vmkernel","channel":"/var/log/vmkernel.log","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1023","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1023","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Relay patterns across IP hops","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1023","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1023","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN1024","name":"Analytic 1024","guidance":"Encrypted traffic or ICMP tunneling from border routers to internal routers or unknown external IPs. Forwarded traffic shows consistent hop-to-hop relaying without matching configured VPN or expected network topology.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1024","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"VPNConfigWhitelist","description":"Define allowed internal router communication paths."},{"field":"ICMPPayloadEntropy","description":"High entropy ICMP payloads may indicate tunneling activity."},{"field":"RelayChainSignature","description":"Track known multi-hop pattern signatures or port hopping techniques."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Relayed session pathing (multi-hop)","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1024","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1024","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Firewall","channel":"Outbound encrypted traffic","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1024","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1024","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0004","component":"Firmware Modification","name":"networkdevice:syslog","channel":"Custom firmware or routing changes","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1024","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0359#AN1024","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0004/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","tag":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S1087","name":"AsyncRAT","page":"tools/S1087/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S1144","name":"FRP","page":"tools/S1144/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0183","name":"Tor","page":"tools/S0183/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1090","id":"T1090","name":"Proxy","page":"detections/enterprise/T1090/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S1087","name":"AsyncRAT","page":"tools/S1087/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S1144","name":"FRP","page":"tools/S1144/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0183","name":"Tor","page":"tools/S0183/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0022","name":"Uroburos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022","kind":"malware","description":"[Uroburos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022) can use implants on multiple compromised machines to proxy communications through its worldwide P2P network.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--48aaad9e-bd08-4730-bf58-2c760a113ed4","references":[{"source_name":"Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023","description":"FBI et al. (2023, May 9). Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware. Retrieved June 8, 2023.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/aa23-129a_snake_malware_2.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0183","name":"Tor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183","kind":"tool","description":"Traffic traversing the [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network will be forwarded to multiple nodes before exiting the [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network and continuing on to its intended destination.(Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)","relationship_id":"relationship--92e4cc06-5708-4486-92cc-0d25d9a755d4","references":[{"source_name":"Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router","description":"Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson. (2004). Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Retrieved December 21, 2017.","url":"http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0276","name":"Keydnap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0276","kind":"malware","description":"[Keydnap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0276) uses a copy of tor2web proxy for HTTPS communications.(Citation: synack 2016 review)","relationship_id":"relationship--02e4c930-ffc1-4bcb-a989-12db90671f90","references":[{"source_name":"synack 2016 review","description":"Patrick Wardle. (2017, January 1). Mac Malware of 2016. Retrieved September 21, 2018.","url":"https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x16.html"}]},{"id":"S0281","name":"Dok","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281","kind":"malware","description":"[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) downloads and installs [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) via homebrew.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a9bf9268-1c45-4293-a5c2-c493556ad546","references":[{"source_name":"objsee mac malware 2017","description":"Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.","url":"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"}]},{"id":"S0282","name":"MacSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0282","kind":"malware","description":"[MacSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0282) uses [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for command and control.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--0e113a7f-2aba-4dc6-b4fc-4c0f0d013c3d","references":[{"source_name":"objsee mac malware 2017","description":"Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.","url":"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"}]},{"id":"S0342","name":"GreyEnergy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0342","kind":"malware","description":"[GreyEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0342) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) relays for Command and Control servers.(Citation: ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f97d56a-3484-47fb-a232-5a20121fa89c","references":[{"source_name":"ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018","description":"Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ESET_GreyEnergy.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0366","name":"WannaCry","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366","kind":"malware","description":"[WannaCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366) uses [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for command and control traffic.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf498579-a7c9-4d06-949b-fb75bf762990","references":[{"source_name":"SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis"}]},{"id":"S0384","name":"Dridex","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384","kind":"malware","description":"[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--e496b3d5-3608-49e6-9567-86b370abeeb3","references":[{"source_name":"Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021","description":"Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/"}]},{"id":"S0386","name":"Ursnif","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386","kind":"malware","description":"[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for C2.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--186ee163-fb1f-4a7d-b7d9-3c01efbb2be0","references":[{"source_name":"NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016","description":"NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/ursnif"},{"source_name":"ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016","description":"Proofpoint Staff. (2016, August 25). Nightmare on Tor Street: Ursnif variant Dreambot adds Tor functionality. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ursnif-variant-dreambot-adds-tor-functionality"}]},{"id":"S0438","name":"Attor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438","kind":"malware","description":"[Attor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for C2 communication.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--278b9898-50c6-4c6d-9a35-7079ed580e78","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Attor Oct 2019","description":"Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0491","name":"StrongPity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491","kind":"malware","description":"[StrongPity](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491) can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c1d36d2e-a8ab-4132-8690-e97628a07a0f","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020","description":"Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) nodes for C2.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--c9fbbab5-c6f1-4aed-bf1f-ea7c83e4d1f2","references":[{"source_name":"Dragos Crashoverride 2017","description":"Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Retrieved December 18, 2020.","url":"https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0623","name":"Siloscape","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623","kind":"malware","description":"[Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) uses [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) to communicate with C2.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--516c98bb-bef8-4f24-ac69-acb3b662a870","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021","description":"Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/siloscape/"}]},{"id":"S0641","name":"Kobalos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641","kind":"malware","description":"[Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) can chain together multiple compromised machines as proxies to reach their final targets.(Citation: ESET Kobalos Feb 2021)(Citation: ESET Kobalos Jan 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--fdc0030c-ed38-49b0-afcc-266e19aa363e","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Kobalos Feb 2021","description":"M.Leveille, M., Sanmillan, I. (2021, February 2). Kobalos – A complex Linux threat to high performance computing infrastructure. Retrieved August 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/02/02/kobalos-complex-linux-threat-high-performance-computing-infrastructure/"},{"source_name":"ESET Kobalos Jan 2021","description":"M.Leveille, M., Sanmillan, I. (2021, January). A WILD KOBALOS APPEARS Tricksy Linux malware goes after HPCs. Retrieved August 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0687","name":"Cyclops Blink","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687","kind":"malware","description":"[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) nodes for C2 traffic.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--aa498c95-d53a-4ab7-96ba-26d7111d71d0","references":[{"source_name":"NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022","description":"NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.","url":"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter"}]},{"id":"S1087","name":"AsyncRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1087","kind":"tool","description":"[AsyncRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1087) can proxy C2 through a [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) client.(Citation: ESET MirrorFace 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--4318a3e0-de45-4d78-a205-527e08c51fe8","references":[{"source_name":"ESET MirrorFace 2025","description":" Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-akairyu-mirrorface-invites-europe-expo-2025-revives-anel-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S1100","name":"Ninja","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100","kind":"malware","description":"[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to use a proxy chain with up to 255 hops when using TCP.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--8099e8d0-d8a1-407e-ba20-cfae2ae9f640","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022","description":"Dedola, G. (2022, June 21). APT ToddyCat. Retrieved January 3, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/toddycat/106799/"}]},{"id":"S1106","name":"NGLite","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1106","kind":"malware","description":"[NGLite](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1106) has abused NKN infrastructure for its C2 communication.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)","relationship_id":"relationship--bd95ad97-90ed-4d48-bd50-a4ac234d63ad","references":[{"source_name":"NGLite Trojan","description":"Robert Falcone, Jeff White, and Peter Renals. (2021, November 7). Targeted Attack Campaign Against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Delivers Godzilla Webshells, NGLite Trojan and KdcSponge Stealer. Retrieved February 8, 2024.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/"}]},{"id":"S1107","name":"NKAbuse","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1107","kind":"malware","description":"[NKAbuse](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1107) has abused the NKN public blockchain protocol for its C2 communications.(Citation: NKAbuse BC)(Citation: NKAbuse SL)","relationship_id":"relationship--944ddd08-e535-4f66-aec2-051f8b35ae80","references":[{"source_name":"NKAbuse BC","description":"Bill Toulas. (2023, December 14). New NKAbuse malware abuses NKN blockchain for stealthy comms. Retrieved February 8, 2024.","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-nkabuse-malware-abuses-nkn-blockchain-for-stealthy-comms/#google_vignette"},{"source_name":"NKAbuse SL","description":"KASPERSKY GERT. (2023, December 14). Unveiling NKAbuse: a new multiplatform threat abusing the NKN protocol. Retrieved February 8, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/unveiling-nkabuse/111512/"}]},{"id":"S1144","name":"FRP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144","kind":"tool","description":"The [FRP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144) client can be configured to connect to the server through a proxy.(Citation: FRP GitHub)","relationship_id":"relationship--9f6ba73c-5cb7-44c7-8433-ab6fc8c8baca","references":[{"source_name":"FRP GitHub","description":"fatedier. (n.d.). What is frp?. Retrieved July 10, 2024.","url":"https://github.com/fatedier/frp"}]},{"id":"S1184","name":"BOLDMOVE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1184","kind":"malware","description":"[BOLDMOVE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1184) is capable of relaying traffic from command and control servers to follow-on systems.(Citation: Google Cloud BOLDMOVE 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--f0fc42ee-9da6-4ec0-a3ff-8248889febe5","references":[{"source_name":"Google Cloud BOLDMOVE 2023","description":"Scott Henderson, Cristiana Kittner, Sarah Hawley & Mark Lechtik, Google Cloud. (2023, January 19). Suspected Chinese Threat Actors Exploiting FortiOS Vulnerability (CVE-2022-42475). Retrieved December 31, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/chinese-actors-exploit-fortios-flaw/"}]},{"id":"S9001","name":"SystemBC","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9001","kind":"malware","description":"[SystemBC](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9001) has used multiple proxy layers, such as SOCKS5 and [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183), for C2 communication.(Citation: HarmonProofpoint_SystemBC_Aug2019)(Citation: SophosGnGal_SystemBC_Dec2020)(Citation: TrumanKroll_SYSTEMBCServer_Jan2024)(Citation: BlackBasta) [SystemBC](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9001) has also leveraged [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for encrypting and concealing C2 traffic.(Citation: SophosGnGal_SystemBC_Dec2020) The server component of [SystemBC](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9001) has used SOCKS5 for C2 communication.(Citation: TrumanKroll_SYSTEMBCServer_Jan2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--67810ade-edd1-4d33-9677-b8bd8a175638","references":[{"source_name":"BlackBasta","description":"Antonio Cocomazzi and Antonio Pirozzi. (2022, November 3). Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor. Retrieved March 14, 2023.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/"},{"source_name":"SophosGnGal_SystemBC_Dec2020","description":"Gallagher, S., Gn, S. (2020, December 16). Ransomware operators use SystemBC RAT as off-the-shelf Tor backdoor. Retrieved May 16, 2025.","url":"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/12/16/systembc/"},{"source_name":"HarmonProofpoint_SystemBC_Aug2019","description":"Harmon, K., et al. (2019, August 1). SystemBC is like Christmas in July for SOCKS5 Malware and Exploit Kits . Retrieved June 13, 2025.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/systembc-christmas-july-socks5-malware-and-exploit-kits"},{"source_name":"TrumanKroll_SYSTEMBCServer_Jan2024","description":"Truman, D. (2024, January 19). Inside the SYSTEMBC Command-and-Control Server. Retrieved June 18, 2025.","url":"https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/inside-the-systembc-malware-server"}]},{"id":"S9043","name":"Mini Shai-Hulud","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9043","kind":"malware","description":"[Mini Shai-Hulud](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9043) has the ability to exfiltrate stolen credentials via the Session messenger network.(Citation: Wiz Mini Shai-Hulud MAY 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--b0c535b5-f246-4bc4-980c-428a56e0bafc","references":[{"source_name":"Wiz Mini Shai-Hulud MAY 2026","description":"McCarthy, R., Cohen, A., and Read, B. (2026, May 12). Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: TanStack + more npm Packages Compromised. Retrieved July 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.wiz.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-strikes-again-tanstack-more-npm-packages-compromised"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has routed traffic over [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) and VPN servers to obfuscate their activities.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--2b6195a4-72f8-4d31-9824-a7c8a7018134","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020","description":"Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html"}]},{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"A backdoor used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) created a [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) hidden service to forward traffic from the [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--54188543-7746-4158-9a9f-5556bb99ec7a","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant No Easy Breach","description":"Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016/66447908"},{"source_name":"MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/"}]},{"id":"G0030","name":"Lotus Blossom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030) has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--8ec91b01-924a-491c-8b1c-ff1ec49c0ce9","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco LotusBlossom 2025","description":"Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lotus-blossom-espionage-group/"}]},{"id":"G0047","name":"Gamaredon Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) for C2 traffic.(Citation: SymantecCarbonBlack_ShuckwormUSB_Apr2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--d57d2087-dfcf-40d4-904a-27907c321545","references":[{"source_name":"SymantecCarbonBlack_ShuckwormUSB_Apr2025","description":"Threat Hunter Team, Symantec and Carbon Black. (2025, April 10). Shuckworm Targets Foreign Military Mission Based in Ukraine. Retrieved July 23, 2025.","url":"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-ukraine-gammasteel"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has used multi-hop proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--3c4401bf-7a45-4d1d-a4ee-ea00788cd2aa","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021","description":"CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a"}]},{"id":"G0085","name":"FIN4","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN4](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) to log in to victims' email accounts.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--50f68fb8-1e59-4b3a-b389-9c2797f4d347","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014","description":"Vengerik, B. et al.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved December 17, 2018.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220313062515/https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-fin4.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0100","name":"Inception","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0100","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Inception](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0100) used chains of compromised routers to proxy C2 communications between them and cloud service providers.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--3bd9165f-6f5f-4c1a-bdbf-47c733d577a8","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Inception Framework March 2018","description":"Symantec. (2018, March 14). Inception Framework: Alive and Well, and Hiding Behind Proxies. Retrieved May 8, 2020.","url":"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/inception-framework-hiding-behind-proxies"}]},{"id":"G0128","name":"ZIRCONIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128) has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network – consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) – to proxy traffic.(Citation: ORB Mandiant) ","relationship_id":"relationship--8f3c8b37-8437-499b-8b13-d9d6f025a5f3","references":[{"source_name":"ORB Mandiant","description":"Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks"}]},{"id":"G1003","name":"Ember Bear","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--103964f0-77c2-4a20-8026-4e3b5ec1ede0","references":[{"source_name":"CISA GRU29155 2024","description":"US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military-cyber-actors-target-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1017","name":"Volt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has used multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--91a1d7fc-8057-4b7d-bef5-9c92612e4fe5","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024","description":"CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1045","name":"Salt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Salt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045) has leveraged multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.(Citation: CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--2ccd3c21-47e3-4b44-ac5c-bff6af6cdf0f","references":[{"source_name":"CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025","description":"CISA. (2025, September 3). Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. Retrieved September 22, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a"}]},{"id":"G1051","name":"Medusa Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used TOR nodes for communications.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--6066869c-5883-457f-bf48-10f453039b94","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024","description":"Anthony Galiette, Doel Santos. (2024, January 11). Medusa Ransomware Turning Your Files into Stone. Retrieved October 15, 2025.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/medusa-ransomware-escalation-new-leak-site/"},{"source_name":"Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, April 16). The 2025 Ransomware Surge: Context for Medusa’s Rise. Retrieved October 15, 2025.","url":"https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/ransomware/medusa-ransomware-group/"},{"source_name":"Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025","description":"Threat Hunter Team Symantec and Carbon Black. (2025, March 6). Medusa Ransomware Activity Continues to Increase. Retrieved October 15, 2025.","url":"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks"}]},{"id":"G1057","name":"ShinyHunters","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1057","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[ShinyHunters](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1057) has used [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) to host their DLS.(Citation: FBI_SHLMS_May2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--e415632a-d3e4-4b15-b285-4eab032989e4","references":[{"source_name":"FBI_SHLMS_May2026","description":"Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2026, May 15). ShinyHunters: Cyber Criminal Group Attacks Learning Management System. Retrieved July 1, 2026.","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260515"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1037","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like [Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004).","relationship_id":"relationship--4735a1be-c556-4844-9554-d2313376f09a","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"12631354-fdbc-4164-92be-402527e748da","name":"Tor Proxy Usage - MacOS","platforms":["macos"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml","description":"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. \n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[{"description":"Tor must be installed on the machine \n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"9b854b05e324c3141b267fb6bcdaeb5720aa4acf892653c2433ae144b94a2446"},{"id":"14d55ca0-920e-4b44-8425-37eedd72b173","name":"Psiphon","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":3,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml","description":"Psiphon 3 is a circumvention tool from Psiphon Inc. that utilizes VPN, SSH and HTTP Proxy technology to provide you\nwith uncensored access to Internet.\nThis process will launch Psiphon 3 and establish a connection. Shortly after it will be shut down via process kill commands.\nMore information can be found about Psiphon using the following urls\nhttp://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html\nhttps://psiphon.ca/faq.html\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[{"description":"The proxy settings backup file must exist on disk at $env:Temp\\proxy-backup.txt\n"},{"description":"The Psiphon executable must exist in the Downloads folder\n"},{"description":"Batch file containing commands to run must be in src directory \n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"16dfa2d640b7a943308b98b52242ae264fbd4e8e236035f09a5afa6b85571d7c"},{"id":"5ff9d047-6e9c-4357-b39b-5cf89d9b59c7","name":"Tor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD","platforms":["linux"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml","description":"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. \n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[{"description":"Tor must be installed on the machine \n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"3a157272ed7ffa8f40ca3176908c1e969b76adbf3d93d0d3e4aa4190d2a38aed"},{"id":"7b9d85e5-c4ce-4434-8060-d3de83595e69","name":"Tor Proxy Usage - Windows","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml","description":"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful execution, the tor proxy will be launched, run for 60 seconds, and then exit. \n","inputs":{"TorExe":{"description":"Location of tor.exe file.","type":"string","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\tor\\Tor\\tor.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"tor.exe must be installed on the machine \n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"c77379735b78d1485df4bdc868517921275c01ebfbf309ac7112c052f95c453d"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1584.008":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1584.008/","T1601.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1601.001/","T1599":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1599/","T1090.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1090.003/","T1090.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1090.004/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1090.003","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
