{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1078","id":"T1078","name":"Valid Accounts","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"2752834d70d796c415448983db63b559148a2604807d58d2f5727f3fe4106222","description":"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078","external_id":"T1078"},{"source_name":"volexity_0day_sophos_FW","description":"Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"},{"source_name":"CISA MFA PrintNightmare","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a"},{"source_name":"TechNet Credential Theft","description":"Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"}],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","identity","network-infrastructure","onprem","saas","virtualization"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1078.001","id":"T1078.001","name":"Default Accounts","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1078.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1078.002","id":"T1078.002","name":"Domain Accounts","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1078.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1078.003","id":"T1078.003","name":"Local Accounts","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1078.003/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1078.004","id":"T1078.004","name":"Cloud Accounts","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1078.004/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","logon_id","logon_type","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Attributes of existing logon sessions and their association with accounts or hosts.","collection_focus":"Collect supported session inventory and correlate session IDs with authentication, logon and logoff events.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["session_id","account","host","session_type"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Identity and SaaS","description":"Authentication attempts and outcomes for a user or workload account.","collection_focus":"Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","scope":"Interactive, non-interactive and workload sign-in contexts, subject to tenant features and access.","source_id":"entra"},{"name":"Cloud identity service audit","scope":"Issuer-side credential and administrative events where the service supports them.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Application audit instrumentation","scope":"Application-side use of identities and sessions; design fields without raw tokens.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.","Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.","Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","application","result","reason","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.","sources":[{"id":"entra","title":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins"},{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1078","id":"T1078","name":"Valid Accounts","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Containers","ESXi","IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","identity","network-infrastructure","onprem","saas","virtualization"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1078/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1078/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":55,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"eed82177-38f5-4299-8a76-098d50d225ab","title":"Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"kubernetes","service":"audit"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/eed82177-38f5-4299-8a76-098d50d225ab.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_change_admission_controller.yml","author":"kelnage","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb","title":"OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"application","product":"opencanary"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/opencanary/opencanary_ssh_login_attempt.yml","author":"Security Onion Solutions","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d","title":"OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"application","product":"opencanary"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/opencanary/opencanary_ssh_new_connection.yml","author":"Security Onion Solutions","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36","title":"OpenCanary - Telnet Login Attempt","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"application","product":"opencanary"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/opencanary/opencanary_telnet_login_attempt.yml","author":"Security Onion Solutions","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3","title":"Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"aws","service":"cloudtrail"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_cloudtrail_imds_malicious_usage.yml","author":"jamesc-grafana","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"92f84194-8d9a-4ee0-8699-c30bfac59780","title":"AWS Key Pair Import Activity","status":"experimental","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"aws","service":"cloudtrail"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/92f84194-8d9a-4ee0-8699-c30bfac59780.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_ec2_import_key_pair_activity.yml","author":"Ivan Saakov","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"f43f5d2f-3f2a-4cc8-b1af-81fde7dbaf0e","title":"AWS Suspicious SAML Activity","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"aws","service":"cloudtrail"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/f43f5d2f-3f2a-4cc8-b1af-81fde7dbaf0e.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_susp_saml_activity.yml","author":"Austin Songer","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"ebbeb024-5b1d-4e16-9c0c-917f86c708a7","title":"User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"activitylogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/ebbeb024-5b1d-4e16-9c0c-917f86c708a7.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_ad_user_added_to_admin_role.yml","author":"Raphaël CALVET, @MetallicHack","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"a61a3c56-4ce2-4351-a079-88ae4cbd2b58","title":"Azure Kubernetes Admission Controller","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"activitylogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/a61a3c56-4ce2-4351-a079-88ae4cbd2b58.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_kubernetes_admission_controller.yml","author":"Austin Songer @austinsonger","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf","title":"Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"auditlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_ad_account_created_deleted.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"4ad97bf5-a514-41a4-abd3-4f3455ad4865","title":"Guest Users Invited To Tenant By Non Approved Inviters","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"auditlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/4ad97bf5-a514-41a4-abd3-4f3455ad4865.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_ad_guest_users_invited_to_tenant_by_non_approved_inviters.yml","author":"MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"352a54e1-74ba-4929-9d47-8193d67aba1e","title":"Azure Domain Federation Settings Modified","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"auditlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/352a54e1-74ba-4929-9d47-8193d67aba1e.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_federation_modified.yml","author":"Austin Songer","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd","title":"PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"auditlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_pim_alerts_disabled.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d","title":"Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via AuditLogs","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"auditlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_auditlogs.yml","author":"Austin Songer @austinsonger","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8","title":"Activity From Anonymous IP Address","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"riskdetection"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_anonymous_ip_activity.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e","title":"Atypical Travel","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"riskdetection"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_atypical_travel.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a","title":"Impossible Travel","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"riskdetection"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_impossible_travel.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476","title":"New Country","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"riskdetection"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_new_coutry_region.yml","author":"Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria 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Logs","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#48-remote-access-and-vpn-authentication-logs"}],"context_references":[{"title":"Scattered Spider joint advisory — downloaded copy","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/reports/cti-ir/fbi-aa23-320a-scattered-spider.pdf"},{"title":"original source","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231116.pdf"}]}],"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Multivariate Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#48-multivariate-combination-anomaly"},{"title":"Peer-Group Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#8-peer-group-anomaly"},{"title":"Self-Baseline Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#7-self-baseline-anomaly"},{"title":"Temporal-Context Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#21-temporal-context-anomaly"}],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0560","name":"Detection of Valid Account Abuse Across Platforms","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--a6245075-b59f-46cf-8b76-e8d95c378a22","relationship_id":"relationship--1b5cdb10-15a7-48ac-ab23-33edf7ef5602","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1543","name":"Analytic 1543","guidance":"Detection of compromised or misused valid accounts via anomalous logon patterns, abnormal logon types, and inconsistent geographic or time-based activity across Windows endpoints.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1543","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"LogonType","description":"Flag unexpected logon types (e.g., Type 10 for remote interactive logins) for sensitive accounts."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Define acceptable hours for interactive logon activity (e.g., 9AM-6PM local)."},{"field":"GeoIPMismatch","description":"Trigger on location anomalies based on prior user behavior or policy."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0067","component":"Logon Session Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4624","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1543","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1543","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0067/"},{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4776, 4625","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1543","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1543","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1543","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1543","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN1544","name":"Analytic 1544","guidance":"Detection of valid account misuse through SSH logins, sudo/su abuse, and service account anomalies outside expected patterns.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1544","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"UserContext","description":"Identify logins to root or sudoers not aligned with normal usage profiles."},{"field":"HostDensityThreshold","description":"Number of unique systems a user authenticates to in a time window."},{"field":"LoginMethod","description":"Trigger on rarely used access methods such as password instead of SSH key."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1544","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1544","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"NSM:Connections","channel":"sshd or PAM logins","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1544","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1544","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"}]},{"id":"AN1545","name":"Analytic 1545","guidance":"Detection of interactive and remote logins by service accounts or users at unusual times, with unexpected child process activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1545","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"LoginOrigin","description":"Login sourced from unexpected remote addresses."},{"field":"ProcessTreeDepth","description":"Track execution depth or anomalous chains post-login."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0088","component":"Logon Session Metadata","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"loginwindow, sshd","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1545","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1545","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0088/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"exec logs","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1545","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1545","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN1546","name":"Analytic 1546","guidance":"Detection of valid account abuse in IdP logs via geographic anomalies, impossible travel, risky sign-ins, and multiple MFA attempts or failures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1546","platforms":["Identity Provider"],"tuning":[{"field":"MFAFailureCount","description":"Threshold of failed MFA attempts before alerting."},{"field":"RiskScoreThreshold","description":"Custom threshold based on calculated identity risk."},{"field":"IPGeoVelocity","description":"Detect impossible travel (logins from two distant geolocations within short time)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"saas:okta","channel":"Sign-in logs / audit events","platforms":["Identity Provider"],"analytic_id":"AN1546","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1546","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"}]},{"id":"AN1547","name":"Analytic 1547","guidance":"Detection of containerized service accounts or compromised kubeconfigs being used for cluster access from unexpected nodes or IPs.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1547","platforms":["Containers"],"tuning":[{"field":"ServiceAccountScope","description":"Validate access from expected namespaces only."},{"field":"ClusterIPWhitelist","description":"Permit kubeconfig usage from a limited set of IPs."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"kubernetes:audit","channel":"authentication.k8s.io","platforms":["Containers"],"analytic_id":"AN1547","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0560#AN1547","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","tag":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0038","name":"Duqu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038","kind":"malware","description":"Adversaries can instruct [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on remote machines that executes the malware.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)","relationship_id":"relationship--448a35fc-fecf-4373-9888-30c37dd1d56a","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec W32.Duqu","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20111213083345/https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0053","name":"SeaDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053","kind":"malware","description":"Some [SeaDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053) samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.(Citation: Symantec Seaduke 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--32864e94-8581-4f77-bf7d-53aaf3710f60","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Seaduke 2015","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2015, July 13). “Forkmeiamfamous”: Seaduke, latest weapon in the Duke armory. Retrieved July 22, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150717011546/http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory"}]},{"id":"S0362","name":"Linux Rabbit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362","kind":"malware","description":"[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--e5ba408f-92d3-404a-b3e1-adcd5d21bc5f","references":[{"source_name":"Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018","description":"Anomali Labs. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved March 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat"}]},{"id":"S0567","name":"Dtrack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567","kind":"malware","description":"[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)","relationship_id":"relationship--3916c36b-bd92-4070-bc9a-6eab3d78cabd","references":[{"source_name":"CyberBit Dtrack","description":"Hod Gavriel. (2019, November 21). Dtrack: In-depth analysis of APT on a nuclear power plant. Retrieved January 20, 2021.","url":"https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/dtrack-apt-malware-found-in-nuclear-power-plant/"}]},{"id":"S0599","name":"Kinsing","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599","kind":"malware","description":"[Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.(Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--13ebbab5-204d-4a61-9ee4-378346626371","references":[{"source_name":"Aqua Kinsing April 2020","description":"Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021.","url":"https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability"}]},{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.(Citation: ESET Industroyer)","relationship_id":"relationship--3ce056f2-7ade-4557-86a8-f0ec216730ec","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Industroyer","description":"Anton Cherepanov. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]},{"id":"S9036","name":"LP-Notes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036","kind":"malware","description":"[LP-Notes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036) has used stolen Windows credentials to log in as the users.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--34bd47fc-20f7-487f-a5af-9cd60cdd3428","references":[{"source_name":"ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025","description":"ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0001","name":"Axiom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)","relationship_id":"relationship--8a83df94-30d3-4d4b-94c0-d988e3fcfc33","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta-Axiom","description":"Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0004","name":"Ke3chang","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--d150b0e5-9e4b-48c4-a952-5234b3d72c6a","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft NICKEL December 2021","description":"MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe"}]},{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm April 2017)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--7606ad11-1322-4b97-83b9-aaafaee02c07","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Pawn Storm April 2017","description":"Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Two Years of Pawn Storm: Examining an Increasingly Relevant Threat. Retrieved May 3, 2017.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-two-years-of-pawn-storm.pdf"},{"source_name":"Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019","description":"MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.","url":"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/"},{"source_name":"DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018","description":"Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/07/13/gru.indictment.pdf"},{"source_name":"Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021","description":"NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF"}]},{"id":"G0008","name":"Carbanak","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)","relationship_id":"relationship--58882b0d-0f4a-4e12-b8c1-f43c53fd96f4","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Carbanak","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0011","name":"PittyTiger","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--93b12e1a-7f21-4fa0-9b2a-c96c7c270625","references":[{"source_name":"Bizeul 2014","description":"Bizeul, D., Fontarensky, I., Mouchoux, R., Perigaud, F., Pernet, C. (2014, July 11). Eye of the Tiger. Retrieved September 29, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200921155301/https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-eye-of-the-tiger/"}]},{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--b1bddecd-763f-42f2-bb49-360d2507b7a6","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022","description":"Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft"}]},{"id":"G0026","name":"APT18","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026) actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.(Citation: RSA2017 Detect and Respond Adair)","relationship_id":"relationship--1ac5bace-cdc2-4a1b-abad-d30ca0ed7f45","references":[{"source_name":"RSA2017 Detect and Respond Adair","description":"Adair, S. (2017, February 17). Detecting and Responding to Advanced Threats within Exchange Environments. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210803040540/https://published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/rsaus17/sessionsFiles/5009/HTA-F02-Detecting-and-Responding-to-Advanced-Threats-within-Exchange-Environments.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0027","name":"Threat Group-3390","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)","relationship_id":"relationship--78f237da-f58b-4849-b2ee-cf1f3f7a1a42","references":[{"source_name":"Dell TG-3390","description":"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage"}]},{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--2c9c331c-0e39-43ad-95e4-38957ad7b956","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021","description":"Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/"}]},{"id":"G0034","name":"Sandworm Team","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--50156329-1c32-4044-9c6e-ee2eb079cd1c","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016","description":"US-CERT. (2016, February 25). ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01"}]},{"id":"G0035","name":"Dragonfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--1896ca51-adf4-4a3b-be89-1aae18465741","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA18-074A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"},{"source_name":"Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021","description":"Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.","url":"https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf"},{"source_name":"CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020","description":"CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions"}]},{"id":"G0037","name":"FIN6","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"To move laterally on a victim network, [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--da395019-238a-4c4e-b4cd-43947e8aa019","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 April 2016","description":"FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190807112824/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"},{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019","description":"McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html"},{"source_name":"Visa FIN6 Feb 2019","description":"Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019.","url":"https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0039","name":"Suckfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Suckfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039) used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--82b679af-7408-4f41-8fc0-5b0cf5993726","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Suckfly May 2016","description":"DiMaggio, J. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016.","url":"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/indian-organizations-targeted-suckfly-attacks"}]},{"id":"G0045","name":"menuPass","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--44273d72-b0d9-42ee-9e8e-53d1b39f0651","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist APT10 March 2021","description":"GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/"},{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf"},{"source_name":"Symantec Cicada November 2020","description":"Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.","url":"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-japan-espionage"},{"source_name":"District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018","description":"US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download"}]},{"id":"G0046","name":"FIN7","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--08e70a50-f4fe-4856-9bd1-a7098f802fca","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021","description":"Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/"}]},{"id":"G0049","name":"OilRig","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--9779ccbc-c376-4a6e-a43f-56a782892302","references":[{"source_name":"Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020","description":"Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.","url":"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf"},{"source_name":"FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017","description":"Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.","url":"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east"},{"source_name":"IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019","description":"Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200211083637/https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/"},{"source_name":"Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023","description":"Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230610050742/https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=evasive-serpens"}]},{"id":"G0051","name":"FIN10","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN10](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051) has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--d3b787ec-795c-481b-94e5-ff42dc56d79d","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN10 June 2017","description":"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/rpt-fin-10-anatomy-of-a-cyber-en.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0053","name":"FIN5","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053) has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.(Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--e25b4146-2f52-4c5b-a1f8-3e868e767f84","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016","description":"Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.","url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8"},{"source_name":"DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015","description":"Higgins, K. (2015, October 13). Prolific Cybercrime Gang Favors Legit Login Credentials. Retrieved October 4, 2017.","url":"https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/prolific-cybercrime-gang-favors-legit-login-credentials/d/d-id/1322645?"},{"source_name":"FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017","description":"Scavella, T. and Rifki, A. (2017, July 20). Are you Ready to Respond? (Webinar). Retrieved October 4, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190304204552/https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Are-you-ready-to-respond.html"}]},{"id":"G0061","name":"FIN8","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--060e7485-d2a9-4aa2-a742-58f7e4e6086a","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016","description":"Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy:  New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.","url":"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"}]},{"id":"G0064","name":"APT33","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)","relationship_id":"relationship--d3d44322-8902-4f56-8625-fb14557c0ca8","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017","description":"Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"},{"source_name":"FireEye APT33 Guardrail","description":"Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)(Citation: CISA Leviathan 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--90268df8-948a-4eb4-a21c-7b1c6808f669","references":[{"source_name":"Accenture MUDCARP March 2019","description":"Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210722005437/https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-96/Accenture-Security-MUDCARP.pdf"},{"source_name":"CISA Leviathan 2024","description":"CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-190a"},{"source_name":"CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021","description":"CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a"}]},{"id":"G0085","name":"FIN4","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN4](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085) has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--073fd81c-b49a-4800-b73a-c1b3aba3aa54","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014","description":"Vengerik, B. & Dennesen, K.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street?  FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved January 15, 2019.","url":"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-14Q4NAMFIN4.html"},{"source_name":"FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014","description":"Vengerik, B. et al.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved December 17, 2018.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220313062515/https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-fin4.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0087","name":"APT39","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--ea230e17-d23a-4a11-b2f9-358eeeea4ea3","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT39 Jan 2019","description":"Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html"}]},{"id":"G0091","name":"Silence","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Silence](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091) has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--9569bfcd-38f8-4cb7-8470-a473ea9e4328","references":[{"source_name":"Group IB Silence Sept 2018","description":"Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020.","url":"https://go.group-ib.com/report-silence-en?_gl=1*d1bh3a*_ga*MTIwMzM5Mzc5MS4xNjk4OTI5NzY4*_ga_QMES53K3Y2*MTcwNDcyMjU2OS40LjEuMTcwNDcyMzU1Mi41My4wLjA."}]},{"id":"G0093","name":"GALLIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--1a849525-ee44-4c28-86b2-fe883c45dc79","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers"}]},{"id":"G0096","name":"APT41","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--0528b64e-e719-44a9-94aa-0576bd9a87ec","references":[{"source_name":"Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020","description":"Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.","url":"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf"},{"source_name":"FireEye APT41 Aug 2019","description":"Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0102","name":"Wizard Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--ad06b85a-a0df-41aa-8f45-f41504987918","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019","description":"John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/"},{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021","description":"Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220313061955/https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-10/fin12-group-profile.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0114","name":"Chimera","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--2fff97fc-650c-4db5-97d4-c36db70077dd","references":[{"source_name":"Cycraft Chimera April 2020","description":"Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020..","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231214094657/https://cycraft.com/download/CyCraft-Whitepaper-Chimera_V4.1.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0117","name":"Fox Kitten","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--db08c6bc-0a2a-41f3-bcb2-5410f9e0afa6","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020","description":"CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-259a"}]},{"id":"G0119","name":"Indrik Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) has used valid accounts for initial access and lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165) [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) has also maintained access to the victim environment through the VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f0596f7-159c-43c0-a848-cffb02fc3c9e","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC2165","description":"Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions/"}]},{"id":"G0122","name":"Silent Librarian","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Silent Librarian](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122) has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--e85549b5-77c8-426a-b7ea-fec30b05973f","references":[{"source_name":"DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018","description":"DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1045781/download"}]},{"id":"G1004","name":"LAPSUS$","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LAPSUS$](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004) has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)(Citation: NCC Group LAPSUS Apr 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--565aa787-f255-45c6-9396-8a53bbb3950e","references":[{"source_name":"NCC Group LAPSUS Apr 2022","description":"Brown, D., et al. (2022, April 28). LAPSUS$: Recent techniques, tactics and procedures. Retrieved December 22, 2022.","url":"https://www.nccgroup.com/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/"},{"source_name":"MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022","description":"MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"}]},{"id":"G1005","name":"POLONIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--e145eb03-1e0b-4062-ab24-20269e3e85d0","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022","description":"Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/06/02/exposing-polonium-activity-and-infrastructure-targeting-israeli-organizations/"}]},{"id":"G1015","name":"Scattered Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has used compromised credentials for initial access.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025)(Citation: Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--18723832-1945-437e-a750-08b2557e88f8","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025","description":"Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, July 23). From Help Desk to Hypervisor: Defending Your VMware vSphere Estate from UNC3944. Retrieved October 13, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defending-vsphere-from-unc3944"},{"source_name":"Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025","description":"Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, May 6). Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines. Retrieved October 13, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations"}]},{"id":"G1017","name":"Volt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"\n[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) relies primarily on valid credentials for persistence.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--1cc1f98f-5537-40bf-9693-e11e74a0332f","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024","description":"CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1021","name":"Cinnamon Tempest","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1021","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Cinnamon Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1021) has used compromised user accounts to deploy payloads and create system services.(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--525624eb-cb0e-48b4-aa53-725a33696c8c","references":[{"source_name":"Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022","description":"Biderman, O. et al. (2022, October 3). REVEALING EMPEROR DRAGONFLY: NIGHT SKY AND CHEERSCRYPT - A SINGLE RANSOMWARE GROUP. Retrieved December 6, 2023.","url":"https://blog.sygnia.co/revealing-emperor-dragonfly-a-chinese-ransomware-group"}]},{"id":"G1024","name":"Akira","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses valid account information to remotely access victim networks, such as VPN credentials.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--536ce093-85f3-4e80-9f61-4fa3739e874a","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024","description":"Nutland, J. and Szeliga, M. (2024, October 21). Akira ransomware continues to evolve. Retrieved December 10, 2024.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/"},{"source_name":"Secureworks GOLD SAHARA","description":"Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-sahara"},{"source_name":"Arctic Wolf Akira 2023","description":"Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.","url":"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/conti-and-akira-chained-together/"}]},{"id":"G1032","name":"INC Ransom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"\n[INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) has used compromised valid accounts for access to victim environments.(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransomware May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--d80025ab-a35d-400d-b08d-9fd6f6a3ce4a","references":[{"source_name":"Huntress INC Ransomware May 2024","description":"Carvey, H. (2024, May 1). LOLBin to INC Ransomware. Retrieved June 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/lolbin-to-inc-ransomware"},{"source_name":"Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023","description":"Cybereason Security Research Team. (2023, November 20). Threat Alert: INC Ransomware. Retrieved June 5, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231202022946/https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/threat-alert-inc-ransomware.pdf"},{"source_name":"SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024","description":"SOCRadar. (2024, January 24). Dark Web Profile: INC Ransom. Retrieved June 5, 2024.","url":"https://socradar.io/dark-web-profile-inc-ransom/"},{"source_name":"Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023","description":"Team Huntress. (2023, August 11). Investigating New INC Ransom Group Activity. Retrieved June 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/investigating-new-inc-ransom-group-activity"}]},{"id":"G1033","name":"Star Blizzard","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) has used stolen credentials to sign into victim email accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--e99ebaf9-e899-4339-b8db-2a98e5476cd4","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023","description":"CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/15/disrupting-seaborgiums-ongoing-phishing-operations/"}]},{"id":"G1040","name":"Play","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) has used valid VPN accounts to achieve initial access.(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--857b5251-78d1-4f73-ac6a-e3f231718630","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023","description":"CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a"}]},{"id":"G1041","name":"Sea Turtle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1041","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sea Turtle](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1041) used compromised credentials to maintain long-term access to victim environments.(Citation: Talos Sea Turtle 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--e99047df-3542-438f-ba61-d0035daae707","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Sea Turtle 2019","description":"Cisco Talos. (2019, April 17). Sea Turtle: DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service. Retrieved November 20, 2024.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/seaturtle/"}]},{"id":"G1043","name":"BlackByte","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BlackByte](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043) has gained access to victim environments through legitimate VPN credentials.(Citation: Cisco BlackByte 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--c4b47c6e-2a98-4b46-a0dc-39d40361e3f7","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco BlackByte 2024","description":"James Nutland, Craig Jackson, Terryn Valikodath, & Brennan Evans. (2024, August 28). BlackByte blends tried-and-true tradecraft with newly disclosed vulnerabilities to support ongoing attacks. Retrieved December 16, 2024.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/blackbyte-blends-tried-and-true-tradecraft-with-newly-disclosed-vulnerabilities-to-support-ongoing-attacks/"}]},{"id":"G1045","name":"Salt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Salt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045) has used logged into accounts on Cisco devices by cracking weak hashed passwords from configuration files.(Citation: CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--6bf63d36-f3d2-4cc6-a2ad-b6bc2fffdba1","references":[{"source_name":"CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025","description":"CISA. (2025, September 3). Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. Retrieved September 22, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a"}]},{"id":"G1048","name":"UNC3886","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) has used tools to hijack valid SSH accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--c3052152-0382-4944-9e77-d63e94fff700","references":[{"source_name":"Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024","description":" Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations"}]},{"id":"G1051","name":"Medusa Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized compromised legitimate local and domain accounts within the victim environment to facilitate remote access and lateral movement sometimes in combination with [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--7b80314c-db86-42f1-8b77-e86c6d29e728","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2025, March 12). AA25-071A #StopRansomware: Medusa Ransomware. Retrieved October 15, 2025.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-071a"}]},{"id":"G1055","name":"VOID MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also validated and tested authentication using compromised credentials prior to malicious actions.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--ed654116-e466-4c79-adc7-3646fda6ae8e","references":[{"source_name":"Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026","description":"Check Point Research. (2026, March 12). “Handala Hack” – Unveiling Group’s Modus Operandi. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/handala-hack-unveiling-groups-modus-operandi/"},{"source_name":"Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026","description":"DomainTools Investigations. (2026, April 6). Handala: MOIS Linked Cyber Influence Ecosystem Threat Intelligence Assessment. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://dti.domaintools.com/research/handala-mois-linked-cyber-influence-ecosystem-threat-intelligence-assessment"}]},{"id":"G1056","name":"TeamPCP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) has compromised credentials associated with open source security scanning tools and used them to push malicious code to all the resources the tools had access to.(Citation: Aikido TeamPCP Telnyx MAR 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--35d07314-02d5-4c48-bce7-addb6bbdf36e","references":[{"source_name":"Aikido TeamPCP Telnyx MAR 2026","description":"Eriksen, C. (2026, March 27). Popular telnyx package compromised on PyPI by TeamPCP. Retrieved July 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-canisterworm"}]},{"id":"G1057","name":"ShinyHunters","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1057","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[ShinyHunters](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1057) has used valid high-privileged SSO users as leverage during negotiations.(Citation: ElecticIQ Buyukkaya_ShinyHunters_Sept2025)   ","relationship_id":"relationship--4cbfc615-1e0d-4140-bf36-8b83b6a087d2","references":[{"source_name":"ElecticIQ Buyukkaya_ShinyHunters_Sept2025","description":"Büyükkaya, A. (2025, September 22). ShinyHunters Calling: Financially Motivated Data Extortion Group Targeting Enterprise Cloud Applications. Retrieved May 18, 2026.","url":"https://blog.eclecticiq.com/shinyhunters-calling-financially-motivated-data-extortion-group-targeting-enterprise-cloud-applications"}]},{"id":"G1058","name":"The Gentlemen","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1058","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[The Gentlemen](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1058) has leveraged compromised user credentials to gain access to victim hosts.(Citation: Intel471_TheGentlemen_Aug2026)(Citation: BradyUnit42_TheGentlemen_July2026)(Citation: CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--fd395e10-4062-4f79-a510-886bd6264771","references":[{"source_name":"BradyUnit42_TheGentlemen_July2026","description":"Brady, M. (2026, July 10). No Manners Here: The Ruthless Rise of The Gentlemen Ransomware. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/the-gentlemen-ransomware/"},{"source_name":"CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026","description":"Carvey, H., O'Donnell-Welch, L. (2026, May 21). The Gentlemen (Ransomware) in Disguise: Defense Evasion and other TTPs. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-gentlemen-ransomware-defense-evasion-ttps"},{"source_name":"Intel471_TheGentlemen_Aug2026","description":"Intel 471. (2026, August 11). Threat Hunting Case Study: The Gentlemen. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.intel471.com/blog/threat-hunting-case-study-the-gentlemen"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1013","name":"Application Developer Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage).","relationship_id":"relationship--c8acdf40-8237-487f-8255-91afa327705d","references":[]},{"id":"M1015","name":"Active Directory Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1015","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead.","relationship_id":"relationship--eed29e0f-59c1-4fab-8268-3f0571e90748","references":[]},{"id":"M1017","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications.","relationship_id":"relationship--edaeb27a-9226-4805-ae45-87312a2dc013","references":[]},{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed.","relationship_id":"relationship--555abf76-531f-4d35-9783-ed7c2a3f213b","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege) These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not been authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)","relationship_id":"relationship--89887815-acfc-42f9-9172-81437cf9ff69","references":[{"source_name":"TechNet Credential Theft","description":"Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"},{"source_name":"TechNet Least Privilege","description":"Microsoft. (2016, April 16). Implementing Least-Privilege Administrative Models. Retrieved June 3, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487450.aspx"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Securing Privileged Access","description":"Plett, C., Poggemeyer, L. (12, October 26). Securing Privileged Access Reference Material. Retrieved April 25, 2017.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material#a-nameesaebmaesae-administrative-forest-design-approach"}]},{"id":"M1027","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.(Citation: US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet) When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.\n\nPolicies should minimize (if not eliminate) reuse of passwords between different user accounts, especially employees using the same credentials for personal accounts that may not be defended by enterprise security resources.","relationship_id":"relationship--4f24d075-4d6c-49d2-a213-306e4af2083d","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet","description":"US-CERT. (n.d.). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved April 12, 2019.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A"}]},{"id":"M1032","name":"Multi-factor Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all account types, including default, local, domain, and cloud accounts, to prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials are compromised. MFA provides a critical layer of security by requiring multiple forms of verification beyond just a password. This measure significantly reduces the risk of adversaries abusing valid accounts to gain initial access, escalate privileges, maintain persistence, or evade defenses within your network.","relationship_id":"relationship--98167cc6-96de-4f02-83b1-78d7633c4106","references":[]},{"id":"M1036","name":"Account Use Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1036","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.(Citation: Microsoft Common Conditional Access Policies)","relationship_id":"relationship--f2d01f19-b4e7-417a-a936-11af9386b867","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Common Conditional Access Policies","description":"Microsoft. (2022, December 14). Conditional Access templates. Retrieved February 21, 2023.","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-policy-common"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1078":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1078/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1078","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}}]}}