{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1074.001","id":"T1074.001","name":"Local Data Staging","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"a22f8239c806c5132eed6a65ac9201b655105c8d88a9e4eb90d3bbe43bdf64c8","description":"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nAdversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001","external_id":"T1074.001"},{"source_name":"Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021","description":"Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"}],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1074","id":"T1074","name":"Data Staged","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["collection"],"platforms":["ESXi","IaaS","Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1074/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls"],"telemetry_tags":["Cloud Storage Access","Command Execution","File Access","File Creation","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0025","name":"Cloud Storage Access","tag":"Cloud Storage Access","page":"telemetry/DC0025/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1074/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Category-Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#86-category-combination-anomaly"},{"title":"Transition Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#61-transition-anomaly"},{"title":"Volume Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#15-volume-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Category-Combination Anomaly","Transition Anomaly","Volume Anomaly"],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0057","name":"Snapshot Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0057/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Creation of a snapshot or recovery-point artifact.","collection_focus":"Collect snapshot-create APIs and subsequent state; link snapshot to source volume/instance and requesting principal.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["snapshot_id","source_volume","action","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0057","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1074.001","id":"T1074.001","name":"Local Data Staging","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1074.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1074.001/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":4,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412","title":"Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","service":"powershell-classic"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_susp_zip_compress.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb","title":"Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp  - PowerShell Module","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"ps_module","definition":"0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_zip_compress.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9","title":"Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Script","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_zip_compress.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98","title":"Folder Compress To Potentially Suspicious Output Via Compress-Archive Cmdlet","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_zip_compress.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0261","name":"Detection of Local Data Staging Prior to Exfiltration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--e91165c5-e850-465e-9042-6ba82478b522","relationship_id":"relationship--2d994d7b-b354-4824-bee6-7d3161fe0e8d","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0724","name":"Analytic 0724","guidance":"Detects file reads across locations followed by writes to temp or staging directories, often compressed or encrypted, indicating local staging behavior.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0724","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"StagingDirList","description":"Paths such as C:\\Temp, C:\\Windows\\Tasks, etc."},{"field":"ArchivingToolPatterns","description":"Matches to 7z.exe, rar.exe, zip.exe, or custom scripts."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"How long to correlate file reads followed by compression."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0724","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0724","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0724","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0724","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0724","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0724","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"}]},{"id":"AN0725","name":"Analytic 0725","guidance":"Detects aggregation of files from different directories into /tmp, /mnt, or user-specified directories with archiving tools like tar or gzip.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0725","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"StagingDirs","description":"e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, custom user dirs"},{"field":"ArchiveUtilities","description":"tar, gzip, zip, 7z"},{"field":"UserThreshold","description":"Number of files or size written in short time"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"open","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0725","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0725","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0725","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0725","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN0726","name":"Analytic 0726","guidance":"Detects staged data aggregated in /Users/Shared, /private/tmp with compression tools like ditto or zip, initiated via Terminal or AppleScript.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0726","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"StagingTargets","description":"Shared dirs commonly abused for local collection"},{"field":"CompressionBinaries","description":"zip, tar, ditto"},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Seconds/minutes between source file read and output staging write"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"file events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0726","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0726","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"exec logs","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0726","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0726","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN0727","name":"Analytic 0727","guidance":"Detects local staging behavior via snapshot creation or files written into VMFS partitions by scripts or unauthorized shell access.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0727","platforms":["ESXi"],"tuning":[{"field":"SnapshotThreshold","description":"Rapid creation or deletion of snapshots"},{"field":"CLIInvoker","description":"Unexpected CLI/script invocation outside maintenance windows"},{"field":"VMFSWriteRate","description":"Volume of data written locally in short time"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0057","component":"Snapshot Creation","name":"esxi:vmkernel","channel":"snapshot create/write events","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN0727","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0727","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0057/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"esxi:shell","channel":"CLI usage logs","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN0727","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0261#AN0727","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0057","name":"Snapshot Creation","tag":"Snapshot Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0057/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1074","id":"T1074","name":"Data Staged","page":"detections/enterprise/T1074/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0012","name":"PoisonIvy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012","kind":"malware","description":"[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) stages collected data in a text file.(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)","relationship_id":"relationship--7d8e5c4d-afdb-43f9-bfcf-7ed674a516e3","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005","description":"Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99"}]},{"id":"S0013","name":"PlugX","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013","kind":"malware","description":"[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) has collected and staged the victim’s computer files for exfiltration.(Citation: DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--83ea392a-3959-4b29-b7b8-517a20ec836d","references":[{"source_name":"DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024","description":"DOJ. (2024, December 20). Mag. No. 24-mj-1387 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION  FOR A NINTH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT- IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH AND  SEIZURE OF COMPUTERS IN THE  UNITED STATES INFECTED WITH  PLUGX MALWARE . Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1384136/dl"}]},{"id":"S0024","name":"Dyre","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024","kind":"malware","description":"[Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024) has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.(Citation: Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--2d82c7df-baa0-4268-855d-03df92fa35ab","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015","description":"hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2015/11/a-technical-look-at-dyreza/"}]},{"id":"S0035","name":"SPACESHIP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035","kind":"malware","description":"[SPACESHIP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035) identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--9e214d5b-7d46-4135-bc42-4caab16b39d8","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0036","name":"FLASHFLOOD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036","kind":"malware","description":"[FLASHFLOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036) stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the \"%WINDIR%\\$NtUninstallKB885884$\\\" directory.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--e5728c4d-d404-44e8-9e28-3411942c5234","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0038","name":"Duqu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038","kind":"malware","description":"Modules can be pushed to and executed by [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)","relationship_id":"relationship--611cb6eb-efdb-4d74-b354-5064ab52bd34","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec W32.Duqu","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20111213083345/https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0045","name":"ADVSTORESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045","kind":"malware","description":"[ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045) stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)","relationship_id":"relationship--5d397a8d-2195-440d-a0f5-bbf6c3e8f6e4","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Sednit Part 2","description":"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0062","name":"DustySky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062","kind":"malware","description":"[DustySky](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062) created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--7e7c0aa8-a17e-4079-b1fd-188977cf1a6e","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019","description":"GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/gaza-cybergang-group1-operation-sneakypastes/90068/"}]},{"id":"S0081","name":"Elise","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081","kind":"malware","description":"[Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081) creates a file in <code>AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer</code> and stores all harvested data in that file.(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--9e77c6fc-0227-42d6-b4ce-f228115963fe","references":[{"source_name":"Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018","description":"Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165226/https://www.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Z_w_/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-Security-Dragonfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0084","name":"Mis-Type","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084","kind":"malware","description":"[Mis-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084) has temporarily stored collected information to the files `“%AppData%\\{Unique Identifier}\\HOSTRURKLSR”` and `“%AppData%\\{Unique Identifier}\\NEWERSSEMP”`.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)","relationship_id":"relationship--e08fbaf9-0efe-41b1-99f7-ec61f38b175c","references":[{"source_name":"Cylance Dust Storm","description":"Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.","url":"https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0090","name":"Rover","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090","kind":"malware","description":"[Rover](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090) copies files from removable drives to <code>C:\\system</code>.(Citation: Palo Alto Rover)","relationship_id":"relationship--9cef6fec-e4eb-49eb-85db-880138f335bd","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Rover","description":"Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"}]},{"id":"S0094","name":"Trojan.Karagany","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094","kind":"malware","description":"[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) can create directories to store plugin output and stage data for exfiltration.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--7cf7d162-a34f-4951-a643-5bf959283f6b","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Dragonfly","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.","url":"https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments"},{"source_name":"Secureworks Karagany July 2019","description":"Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector"}]},{"id":"S0113","name":"Prikormka","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113","kind":"malware","description":"[Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) creates a directory, <code>%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\SKC\\</code>, which is used to store collected log files.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)","relationship_id":"relationship--df207207-01b2-456b-9dc4-7afd5ffeeb46","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Operation Groundbait","description":"Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0128","name":"BADNEWS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128","kind":"malware","description":"[BADNEWS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128) copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's <code>%temp%\\SMB\\</code> folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--db8f1355-57f0-446d-a261-b168497b20c6","references":[{"source_name":"Forcepoint Monsoon","description":"Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.","url":"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017","description":"Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0136","name":"USBStealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136","kind":"malware","description":"[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)","relationship_id":"relationship--fe229513-0cd9-4e9a-a333-2748ef03dfbc","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014","description":"Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky Sofacy","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.","url":"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"}]},{"id":"S0147","name":"Pteranodon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147","kind":"malware","description":"[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) creates various subdirectories under <code>%Temp%\\reports\\%</code> and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at <code>C:\\Users\\<Username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\store</code> to store screenshot JPEG files.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--c93bb2b9-bd22-4e14-b884-2141168387b2","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017","description":"Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"}]},{"id":"S0149","name":"MoonWind","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0149","kind":"malware","description":"[MoonWind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0149) saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.(Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--9c4a8336-5f5f-4e58-b00d-b6bf1c59ec03","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017","description":"Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, March 30). Trochilus and New MoonWind RATs Used In Attack Against Thai Organizations. Retrieved March 30, 2017.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"}]},{"id":"S0169","name":"RawPOS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169","kind":"malware","description":"Data captured by [RawPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169) is placed in a temporary file under a directory named \"memdump\".(Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--b25f5d90-f6cc-47e9-89f1-5527886bf536","references":[{"source_name":"Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017","description":"Nesbit, B. and Ackerman, D. (2017, January). Malware Analysis Report - RawPOS Malware: Deconstructing an Intruder’s Toolkit. Retrieved October 4, 2017.","url":"https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/malware-analysis-report-rawpos-malware"}]},{"id":"S0170","name":"Helminth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170","kind":"malware","description":"[Helminth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170) creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--9c7ecbf4-88fe-4144-8dc4-f5bca2c3156d","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto OilRig May 2016","description":"Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0196","name":"PUNCHBUGGY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196","kind":"malware","description":"[PUNCHBUGGY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196) has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.(Citation: Morphisec ShellTea June 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--992d6f04-7454-4211-9a44-a5c87fdb7657","references":[{"source_name":"Morphisec ShellTea June 2019","description":"Gorelik, M.. (2019, June 10). SECURITY ALERT: FIN8 IS BACK IN BUSINESS, TARGETING THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY. Retrieved June 13, 2019.","url":"http://blog.morphisec.com/security-alert-fin8-is-back"}]},{"id":"S0197","name":"PUNCHTRACK","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197","kind":"malware","description":"[PUNCHTRACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197) aggregates collected data in a tmp file.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--f38ae08a-0d59-41e9-a4ca-891a04297299","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016","description":"Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy:  New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.","url":"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"}]},{"id":"S0198","name":"NETWIRE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198","kind":"malware","description":"[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the <code>./LOGS</code> directory.(Citation: FireEye NETWIRE March 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--e5562f3f-9657-49e8-8243-b5aff51e18a4","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye NETWIRE March 2019","description":"Maniath, S. and Kadam P. (2019, March 19). Dissecting a NETWIRE Phishing Campaign's Usage of Process Hollowing. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/dissecting-netwire-phishing-campaigns-usage-process-hollowing"}]},{"id":"S0247","name":"NavRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247","kind":"malware","description":"[NavRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247) writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.(Citation: Talos NavRAT May 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--1784577e-9d82-497b-aba1-bc4d5a23d8f8","references":[{"source_name":"Talos NavRAT May 2018","description":"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, May 31). NavRAT Uses US-North Korea Summit As Decoy For Attacks In South Korea. Retrieved June 11, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/navrat.html"}]},{"id":"S0249","name":"Gold Dragon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249","kind":"malware","description":"[Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)","relationship_id":"relationship--74edb7f4-4c3b-4573-abb0-c4842032b6c3","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Gold Dragon","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/"}]},{"id":"S0251","name":"Zebrocy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251","kind":"malware","description":"[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--c4a2a14a-6fb0-46cf-b97d-c4bcb1c751a7","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018","description":"ESET. (2018, November 20). Sednit: What’s going on with Zebrocy?. Retrieved February 12, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/20/sednit-whats-going-zebrocy/"}]},{"id":"S0260","name":"InvisiMole","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260","kind":"malware","description":"[InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018)(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--59193fff-6bea-41c6-b744-36850e6cc39a","references":[{"source_name":"ESET InvisiMole June 2018","description":"Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/"},{"source_name":"ESET InvisiMole June 2020","description":"Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0261","name":"Catchamas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261","kind":"malware","description":"[Catchamas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261) stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.(Citation: Symantec Catchamas April 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--ad77932b-9632-4816-b9af-db6257f5a7d4","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Catchamas April 2018","description":"Balanza, M. (2018, April 02). Infostealer.Catchamas. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165711/https://www-west.symantec.com/content/symantec/english/en/security-center/writeup.html/2018-040209-1742-99"}]},{"id":"S0264","name":"OopsIE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0264","kind":"malware","description":"[OopsIE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0264) stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--0634c754-9660-414f-8304-d9d92e37a0ce","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018","description":"Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan/"}]},{"id":"S0265","name":"Kazuar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265","kind":"malware","description":"[Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.(Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--df48ab06-0916-4d1d-9142-d0a508d0f0d4","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017","description":"Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/"}]},{"id":"S0274","name":"Calisto","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274","kind":"malware","description":"[Calisto](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274) uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.(Citation: Securelist Calisto July 2018)(Citation: Symantec Calisto July 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--dbdf85ca-504d-40f9-9023-ce8acdf99781","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Calisto July 2018","description":"Kuzin, M., Zelensky S. (2018, July 20). Calisto Trojan for macOS. Retrieved September 7, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/"},{"source_name":"Symantec Calisto July 2018","description":"Pantig, J. (2018, July 30). OSX.Calisto. Retrieved September 7, 2018.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190111082249/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2018-073014-2512-99?om_rssid=sr-latestthreats30days"}]},{"id":"S0335","name":"Carbon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335","kind":"malware","description":"[Carbon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335) creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.(Citation: ESET Carbon Mar 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--487cc105-dd80-4b43-94ae-da23517aab6f","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Carbon Mar 2017","description":"ESET. (2017, March 30). Carbon Paper: Peering into Turla’s second stage backdoor. Retrieved November 7, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0337","name":"BadPatch","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0337","kind":"malware","description":"[BadPatch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0337) stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.(Citation: Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--330e86f3-f4ff-4fe0-af64-cd3c86849239","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017","description":"Bar, T., Conant, S. (2017, October 20). BadPatch. Retrieved November 13, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-badpatch/"}]},{"id":"S0340","name":"Octopus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340","kind":"malware","description":"[Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--97ffb5c1-05da-42b4-90eb-60c1eedc1292","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Octopus Oct 2018","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/"},{"source_name":"ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018","description":"Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0343","name":"Exaramel for Windows","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343","kind":"malware","description":"[Exaramel for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343) specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018) ","relationship_id":"relationship--ce4321e0-09e0-4e3a-b673-8a6e9248e720","references":[{"source_name":"ESET TeleBots Oct 2018","description":"Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/"}]},{"id":"S0353","name":"NOKKI","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353","kind":"malware","description":"[NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) can collect data from the victim and stage it in <code>LOCALAPPDATA%\\MicroSoft Updatea\\uplog.tmp</code>.(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--c7c855ed-9550-4611-84bd-d4d7c86cef3c","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018","description":"Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-new-konni-malware-attacking-eurasia-southeast-asia/"}]},{"id":"S0373","name":"Astaroth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373","kind":"malware","description":"[Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration. (Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--f26e1997-733e-4c3c-ac26-294048466c52","references":[{"source_name":"Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018","description":"Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved September 25, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200302071436/https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/"}]},{"id":"S0386","name":"Ursnif","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386","kind":"malware","description":"[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) has used tmp files to stage gathered information.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--1e46f5cf-dfaf-4cc6-a685-ee876f371b7e","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015","description":"Caragay, R. (2015, March 26). URSNIF: The Multifaceted Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210719165945/https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/15/c/ursnif-the-multifaceted-malware.html?_ga=2.165628854.808042651.1508120821-744063452.1505819992"}]},{"id":"S0395","name":"LightNeuron","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395","kind":"malware","description":"[LightNeuron](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395) can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as <code>C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\NetworkService\\appdata\\Local\\Temp\\</code>.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--87999cb2-7565-465a-ad10-b585be2e3e3f","references":[{"source_name":"ESET LightNeuron May 2019","description":"Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0409","name":"Machete","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409","kind":"malware","description":"[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--79333543-6031-4aa4-91be-35d80fae8ed2","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Machete July 2019","description":"ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf"},{"source_name":"Cylance Machete Mar 2017","description":"The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html"}]},{"id":"S0438","name":"Attor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438","kind":"malware","description":"[Attor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438) has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--6376c6be-5ec7-4775-8984-13a1474dc92d","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Attor Oct 2019","description":"Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0443","name":"MESSAGETAP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443","kind":"malware","description":"[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--aa12e2a6-02e7-4001-af7b-6a60021ddbfd","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019","description":"Leong, R., Perez, D., Dean, T. (2019, October 31). MESSAGETAP: Who’s Reading Your Text Messages?. Retrieved May 11, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/messagetap-who-is-reading-your-text-messages.html"}]},{"id":"S0458","name":"Ramsay","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458","kind":"malware","description":"[Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) can stage data prior to exfiltration in <code>%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\UserSetting</code> and <code>%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\UserSetting\\MediaCache</code>.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--4b03f718-f89a-4652-b3be-5cbe4e0e044f","references":[{"source_name":"Eset Ramsay May 2020","description":"Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/13/ramsay-cyberespionage-toolkit-airgapped-networks/"},{"source_name":"Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020","description":"Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.programmersought.com/article/62493896999/"}]},{"id":"S0503","name":"FrameworkPOS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0503","kind":"malware","description":"[FrameworkPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0503) can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\\Windows\\.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--935d1918-a1ea-4c46-b3b0-5c1d0f44a346","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 April 2016","description":"FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190807112824/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0526","name":"KGH_SPY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526","kind":"malware","description":"[KGH_SPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526) can save collected system information to a file named \"info\" before exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--dcd2acb8-0f4a-4007-88ec-0962d66399cf","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020","description":"Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite"}]},{"id":"S0538","name":"Crutch","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0538","kind":"malware","description":"[Crutch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0538) has staged stolen files in the <code>C:\\AMD\\Temp</code> directory.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--dd45bff3-368a-4a3b-a97e-8bdeb753aedf","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Crutch December 2020","description":"Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/02/turla-crutch-keeping-back-door-open/"}]},{"id":"S0567","name":"Dtrack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567","kind":"malware","description":"[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)","relationship_id":"relationship--118d9413-0b34-47e6-b333-b712e78dc404","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Dtrack","description":"Konstantin Zykov. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack. Retrieved January 20, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/"},{"source_name":"CyberBit Dtrack","description":"Hod Gavriel. (2019, November 21). Dtrack: In-depth analysis of APT on a nuclear power plant. Retrieved January 20, 2021.","url":"https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/dtrack-apt-malware-found-in-nuclear-power-plant/"}]},{"id":"S0593","name":"ECCENTRICBANDWAGON","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593","kind":"malware","description":"[ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593) has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the <code>%temp%\\GoogleChrome</code>, <code>%temp%\\Downloads</code>, and <code>%temp%\\TrendMicroUpdate</code> directories.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--f8c1f1e4-4580-4ec6-9bc0-6f24214dc273","references":[{"source_name":"CISA EB Aug 2020","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2020, August 26). MAR-10301706-1.v1 - North Korean Remote Access Tool: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON. Retrieved March 18, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-239a"}]},{"id":"S0615","name":"SombRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615","kind":"malware","description":"[SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--a30e2e98-d6c2-4eb1-b520-1b6757c88c47","references":[{"source_name":"BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020","description":"The BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2020, November 12). The CostaRicto Campaign: Cyber-Espionage Outsourced. Retrieved May 24, 2021.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2020/11/the-costaricto-campaign-cyber-espionage-outsourced"}]},{"id":"S0622","name":"AppleSeed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622","kind":"malware","description":"[AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--d747c1d7-646a-4d72-a00b-e2f10ed1f9eb","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0629","name":"RainyDay","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629","kind":"malware","description":"[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Adobe\\temp</code> prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--6b9d6a84-b73e-4fb3-ad86-64b5832056d4","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Naikon April 2021","description":"Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/396/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-NAIKON-creat5397-en-EN.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0644","name":"ObliqueRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644","kind":"malware","description":"[ObliqueRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644) can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--bb6be5dd-602d-4625-859a-eb6c5bddc29c","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Oblique RAT March 2021","description":"Malhotra, A. (2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/02/obliquerat-new-campaign.html"}]},{"id":"S0647","name":"Turian","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647","kind":"malware","description":"[Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--b30daf73-f565-4c1e-bc0b-77bb1c22b03f","references":[{"source_name":"ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021","description":"Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, 2021","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/"}]},{"id":"S0650","name":"QakBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650","kind":"malware","description":"[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Kroll Qakbot June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--910d0f07-383b-480b-9637-d5b747353bdc","references":[{"source_name":"Kroll Qakbot June 2020","description":"Sette, N. et al. (2020, June 4). Qakbot Malware Now Exfiltrating Emails for Sophisticated Thread Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/qakbot-malware-exfiltrating-emails-thread-hijacking-attacks"}]},{"id":"S0651","name":"BoxCaon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651","kind":"malware","description":"[BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021) ","relationship_id":"relationship--e27daa6c-3577-4f58-9440-7a585e9571d9","references":[{"source_name":"Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021","description":"CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/indigozebra-apt-continues-to-attack-central-asia-with-evolving-tools/"}]},{"id":"S0652","name":"MarkiRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652","kind":"malware","description":"[MarkiRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652) can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c7d7c454-71fb-4a8e-989a-cb2e7404c0d3","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021","description":"GReAT. (2021, June 16). Ferocious Kitten: 6 Years of Covert Surveillance in Iran. Retrieved September 22, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/ferocious-kitten-6-years-of-covert-surveillance-in-iran/102806/"}]},{"id":"S0667","name":"Chrommme","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667","kind":"malware","description":"[Chrommme](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667) can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--5fd8740a-6197-4099-a4d9-af0c9421cfc2","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gelsemium June 2021","description":"Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0673","name":"DarkWatchman","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) can stage local data in the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--343c6e94-fda1-41d6-865e-6a30570afb98","references":[{"source_name":"Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021","description":"Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"}]},{"id":"S1012","name":"PowerLess","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1012","kind":"malware","description":"[PowerLess](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1012) can stage stolen browser data in `C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\cup.tmp` and keylogger data in `C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK`.(Citation: Cybereason PowerLess February 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--87aaf244-2ecb-453e-87c0-836f9a26cc59","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason PowerLess February 2022","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, February 1). PowerLess Trojan: Iranian APT Phosphorus Adds New PowerShell Backdoor for Espionage. Retrieved June 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/powerless-trojan-iranian-apt-phosphorus-adds-new-powershell-backdoor-for-espionage"}]},{"id":"S1015","name":"Milan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1015","kind":"malware","description":"[Milan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1015) has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters `a9850d2f`.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--13e52bdf-aa82-4220-8a02-02c735c4fccf","references":[{"source_name":"ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021","description":"ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.","url":"https://www.clearskysec.com/siamesekitten/"}]},{"id":"S1016","name":"MacMa","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016","kind":"malware","description":"[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--44a77efc-9215-4e5a-a246-ac9669dc52a4","references":[{"source_name":"Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021","description":"Wardle, P. (2021, November 11). OSX.CDDS (OSX.MacMa). Retrieved June 30, 2022.","url":"https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x69.html"}]},{"id":"S1029","name":"AuTo Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1029","kind":"malware","description":"[AuTo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1029) can store collected data from an infected host to a file named `Hostname_UserName.txt` prior to exfiltration.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--066425f1-79cb-4cbc-b570-0280ac503c55","references":[{"source_name":"MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021","description":"Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.","url":"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/12/sidecopy-apt-connecting-lures-to-victims-payloads-to-infrastructure"}]},{"id":"S1037","name":"STARWHALE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037","kind":"malware","description":"[STARWHALE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037) has stored collected data in a file called `stari.txt`.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--f2d62173-bd89-4d00-bcb6-5e4f6fa43df2","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022","description":"Tomcik, R. et al. (2022, February 24). Left On Read: Telegram Malware Spotted in Latest Iranian Cyber Espionage Activity. Retrieved August 18, 2022.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage"}]},{"id":"S1042","name":"SUGARDUMP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1042","kind":"malware","description":"[SUGARDUMP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1042) has stored collected data under `%<malware_execution_folder>%\\\\CrashLog.txt`.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--5b4d7467-8418-42c8-bb6f-ad275fc7fb40","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022","description":"Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-iranian-actor-targeting-israeli-shipping"}]},{"id":"S1043","name":"ccf32","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1043","kind":"malware","description":"[ccf32](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1043) can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--966ce7a3-4306-4003-89d8-9d6af89a0c2e","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020","description":"Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1044","name":"FunnyDream","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044","kind":"malware","description":"[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--20b14e6f-685d-4b88-9ab7-40f7beb99ec4","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020","description":"Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1059","name":"metaMain","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1059","kind":"malware","description":"[metaMain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1059) has stored the collected system files in a working directory.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--4126e124-fb28-4274-a687-dc5344b34859","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022","description":"Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.","url":"https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs22/metador#page=1"},{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022","description":"SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.","url":"https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e9ZTW9b71YwFWS_18ZwDAxa-cYbV8q1wUefmKZLYVsA/edit#heading=h.lmnbtht1ikzm"}]},{"id":"S1060","name":"Mafalda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060","kind":"malware","description":"[Mafalda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060) can place retrieved files into a destination directory.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--421fd048-a5c3-46b0-b1ff-a7510c107879","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022","description":"Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.","url":"https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs22/metador#page=1"}]},{"id":"S1075","name":"KOPILUWAK","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075","kind":"malware","description":"[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has piped the results from executed C2 commands to `%TEMP%\\result2.dat` on the local machine.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--ef651fd2-97e7-4471-a609-41f46003cf11","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023","description":"Hawley, S. et al. (2023, February 2). Turla: A Galaxy of Opportunity. Retrieved May 15, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/turla-galaxy-opportunity"}]},{"id":"S1090","name":"NightClub","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090","kind":"malware","description":"[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has copied captured files and keystrokes to the `%TEMP%` directory of compromised hosts.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--d8c447e8-6581-47ca-98d6-44b262023669","references":[{"source_name":"MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023","description":"Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/"}]},{"id":"S1101","name":"LoFiSe","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1101","kind":"malware","description":"[LoFiSe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1101) can save files to be evaluated for further exfiltration in the `C:\\Programdata\\Microsoft\\` and \t`C:\\windows\\temp\\` folders.\n (Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--959bda8e-6c64-4048-9c34-f8ccd64066e8","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023","description":"Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/toddycat-keep-calm-and-check-logs/110696/"}]},{"id":"S1104","name":"SLOWPULSE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1104","kind":"malware","description":"[SLOWPULSE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1104) can write logged ACE credentials to `/home/perl/PAUS.pm` in append mode, using the format string `%s:%s\\n`.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--830b0685-3b30-4c7b-9b37-2fca346e6fc8","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021","description":"Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day"}]},{"id":"S1109","name":"PACEMAKER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1109","kind":"malware","description":"[PACEMAKER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1109) has written extracted data to `tmp/dsserver-check.statementcounters`.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--fc9b992b-d38d-46f5-84b5-13c0e116a717","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021","description":"Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day"}]},{"id":"S1110","name":"SLIGHTPULSE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1110","kind":"malware","description":"[SLIGHTPULSE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1110) has piped the output from executed commands to `/tmp/1`.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f578b99-3d14-4416-8936-51e11d71a47b","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021","description":"Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day"}]},{"id":"S1124","name":"SocGholish","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124","kind":"malware","description":"[SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124) can send output from `whoami` to a local temp file using the naming convention `rad<5-hex-chars>.tmp`.(Citation: Red Canary SocGholish March 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--e0fdf36c-02e5-4100-b0f2-a1fb28fdd674","references":[{"source_name":"Red Canary SocGholish March 2024","description":"Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.","url":"https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/"}]},{"id":"S1142","name":"LunarMail","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142","kind":"malware","description":"[LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) can create a directory in `%TEMP%\\` to stage data prior to exfilration.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--fca5e5e4-e615-44d5-901e-225fccd329cc","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024","description":"Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/"}]},{"id":"S1149","name":"CHIMNEYSWEEP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149","kind":"malware","description":"[CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) can store captured screenshots to disk including to a covert store named `APPX.%x%x%x%x%x.tmp` where `%x` is a random value.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--0764c8ee-8577-4124-9658-7cc90f74726f","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022","description":"Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against/"}]},{"id":"S1153","name":"Cuckoo Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153","kind":"malware","description":"[Cuckoo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153) has staged collected application data from Safari, Notes, and Keychain to `/var/folder`.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--58643a55-d526-4536-935c-5c1b5c1d9b20","references":[{"source_name":"Kandji Cuckoo April 2024","description":"Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024.","url":"https://www.kandji.io/blog/malware-cuckoo-infostealer-spyware"}]},{"id":"S1154","name":"VersaMem","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154","kind":"malware","description":"[VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) staged captured credentials locally at `/tmp/.temp.data`.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--e86b2094-65ea-45f8-94cc-0467cf2eebd9","references":[{"source_name":"Lumen Versa 2024","description":"Black Lotus Labs. (2024, August 27). Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitaiton. Retrieved August 27, 2024.","url":"https://blog.lumen.com/taking-the-crossroads-the-versa-director-zero-day-exploitation/"}]},{"id":"S1168","name":"SampleCheck5000","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1168","kind":"malware","description":"[SampleCheck5000](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1168) can log the output from C2 commands in an encrypted and compressed format on disk prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--b4e0328b-5ddb-4322-a8db-e736648eab22","references":[{"source_name":"ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023","description":"Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/oilrig-persistent-attacks-cloud-service-powered-downloaders/"}]},{"id":"S1172","name":"OilBooster","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1172","kind":"malware","description":"[OilBooster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1172) can stage files in the `tempFiles` directory for exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--db4032d6-1283-4e1e-a506-110a8600083f","references":[{"source_name":"ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023","description":"Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/oilrig-persistent-attacks-cloud-service-powered-downloaders/"}]},{"id":"S1196","name":"Troll Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1196","kind":"malware","description":"[Troll Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1196) encrypts gathered information on victim devices prior to exfiltrating it through command and control infrastructure.(Citation: S2W Troll Stealer 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--11fdff9c-078b-48f6-ac6c-4a2c89dafc4f","references":[{"source_name":"S2W Troll Stealer 2024","description":"Jiho Kim & Sebin Lee, S2W. (2024, February 7). Kimsuky disguised as a Korean company signed with a valid certificate to distribute Troll Stealer (English ver.). Retrieved January 17, 2025.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/kimsuky-disguised-as-a-korean-company-signed-with-a-valid-certificate-to-distribute-troll-stealer-cfa5d54314e2"}]},{"id":"S1210","name":"Sagerunex","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210","kind":"malware","description":"[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025) [Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--c66dddb1-0003-4af8-9887-5642964e0fd0","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco LotusBlossom 2025","description":"Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lotus-blossom-espionage-group/"},{"source_name":"Symantec Bilbug 2022","description":"Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments-cert-authority"}]},{"id":"S1213","name":"Lumma Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213","kind":"malware","description":"[Lumma Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213) has configured a custom user data directory such as a folder within `%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming` for staging data.(Citation: TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--8c9728bd-f58c-4a78-8b4d-63e8fe8cce31","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025","description":"Buddy Tancio, Fe Cureg, and Jovit Samaniego, Trend Micro. (2025, January 30). Lumma Stealer’s GitHub-Based Delivery Explored via Managed Detection and Response. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/a/lumma-stealers-github-based-delivery-via-mdr.html"}]},{"id":"S1222","name":"RIFLESPINE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1222","kind":"malware","description":"[RIFLESPINE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1222) can stage the output from executed C2 commands to a temporary file.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--e43c3765-10e6-40f4-b318-39ee3f34819e","references":[{"source_name":"Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024","description":" Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations"}]},{"id":"S1233","name":"PAKLOG","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233","kind":"malware","description":"[PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) has stored the captured data in a file located `C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Libraries\\\\record.txt`.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--be20956b-6103-4bfc-a7c4-7e61cbc8cbcd","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025","description":"Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-mustang-panda-arsenal-paklog-corklog-and-splatcloak-p2"}]},{"id":"S1235","name":"CorKLOG","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235","kind":"malware","description":"[CorKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235) has stored the captured data in an encrypted file using a 48-character RC4 key.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--ca413f1f-3a42-48f5-b282-425bf3c24b22","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025","description":"Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-mustang-panda-arsenal-paklog-corklog-and-splatcloak-p2"}]},{"id":"S1245","name":"InvisibleFerret","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1245","kind":"malware","description":"[InvisibleFerret](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1245) has staged data in consolidated folders prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf1a3f3b-cfe6-4eef-b7eb-d0d4adc0187d","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025","description":"Matej Havranek. (2025, February 20). DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers. Retrieved October 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/deceptivedevelopment-targets-freelance-developers/"}]},{"id":"S1246","name":"BeaverTail","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1246","kind":"malware","description":"[BeaverTail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1246) has staged collected data to the system’s temporary directory.(Citation: Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--6d657d75-9718-43a8-985e-44d47d1b1d15","references":[{"source_name":"Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025","description":"Kirill Boychenko. (2025, July 14). Contagious Interview Campaign Escalates With 67 Malicious npm Packages and New Malware Loader. Retrieved October 19, 2025.","url":"https://socket.dev/blog/contagious-interview-campaign-escalates-67-malicious-npm-packages"}]},{"id":"S9010","name":"GlassWorm","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010","kind":"malware","description":"[GlassWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010) has staged collected data in a working directory within a temp folder to include `/tmp/ijewf`.(Citation: Koi Glassworm New Tricks December 2025)(Citation: Socket GlassWorm January 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--66773d13-7e97-493f-a1b6-9484c52cc6a1","references":[{"source_name":"Koi Glassworm New Tricks December 2025","description":"Gal Hachamov. (2025, December 29). GlassWorm Goes Mac: Fresh Infrastructure, New Tricks. Retrieved April 10, 2026.","url":"https://www.koi.ai/blog/glassworm-goes-mac-fresh-infrastructure-new-tricks"},{"source_name":"Socket GlassWorm January 2026","description":"Kirill Boychenko. (2026, January 31). GlassWorm Loader Hits Open VSX via Developer Account Compromise. Retrieved April 10, 2026.","url":"https://socket.dev/blog/glassworm-loader-hits-open-vsx-via-suspected-developer-account-compromise"}]},{"id":"S9013","name":"DRYHOOK","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9013","kind":"malware","description":"[DRYHOOK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9013) has stored stolen credentials for future use in the temp folder of a victimized Ivanti Connect Secure VPN device, specifically in the file location `/tmp/cmmmap.kumMW`.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--648c423a-ac35-411d-8ace-59b511e10fb3","references":[{"source_name":"Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025","description":"John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-zero-day"},{"source_name":"Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025","description":"Sila Ozeren Hacioglu. (2025, May 5). UNC5221’s Latest Exploit: Weaponizing CVE-2025-22457 in Ivanti Connect Secure. Retrieved April 13, 2026.","url":"https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/unc5221-cve-2025-22457-ivanti-connect-secure"}]},{"id":"S9020","name":"LODEINFO","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020","kind":"malware","description":"[LODEINFO](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020) has collected stolen web cookies locally in the `%TEMP%` folder.(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--23a9b432-2d25-45a7-b75f-7496b26702f8","references":[{"source_name":"ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022","description":"Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/"}]},{"id":"S9022","name":"MirrorStealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9022","kind":"malware","description":"[MirrorStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9022) has stored stolen credentials on the local machine in `%TEMP%\\31558.txt`.(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--95ebe979-ec88-489d-ba9d-b4ac2f1f22db","references":[{"source_name":"ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022","description":"Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/"}]},{"id":"S9035","name":"LAMEHUG","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9035","kind":"malware","description":"[LAMEHUG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9035) can save collected data and files of interest in `C:\\ProgramData\\info\\` to consolidate for exfiltration.(Citation: Splunk LAMEHUG SEP 2025)(Citation: Nov AI Threat Tracker)","relationship_id":"relationship--c469874c-492d-4975-abc1-1668fc65a70a","references":[{"source_name":"Splunk LAMEHUG SEP 2025","description":"Conteras, T., Splunk Research Team. (2025, September 25). From Prompt to Payload: LAMEHUG’s LLM-Driven Cyber Intrusion. Retrieved April 21, 2026.","url":"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/lamehug-ai-driven-malware-llm-cyber-intrusion-analysis.html"},{"source_name":"Nov AI Threat Tracker","description":"Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2025, November 5). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Advances in Threat Actor Usage of AI Tools. Retrieved March 31, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools"}]},{"id":"S9036","name":"LP-Notes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036","kind":"malware","description":"[LP-Notes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036) has stored collected credentials in ` C:\\Users\\Public\\Downloads\\lp-notes.txt`.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--42ca6477-eae6-4423-8153-a1e0662f3fe5","references":[{"source_name":"ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025","description":"ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"}]},{"id":"S9041","name":"TeamPCP Cloud Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9041","kind":"malware","description":"[TeamPCP Cloud Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9041) has created a staging file in `/tmp` for collected data.(Citation: Wiz TeamPCP KICS MAR 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--ff1a526c-156a-410c-bd80-f8e2f86b6c3a","references":[{"source_name":"Wiz TeamPCP KICS MAR 2026","description":"McCarthy, R., Haughom, J., Read, B. (2026, March 23). KICS GitHub Action Compromised: TeamPCP Strikes Again in Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved July 1, 2026.","url":"https://www.wiz.io/blog/teampcp-attack-kics-github-action"}]},{"id":"S9050","name":"Vidar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9050","kind":"malware","description":"[Vidar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9050) has compiled collected data into a randomly generated directory in the ProgramData folder.(Citation: Cyfirma_Vidar_June2024)(Citation: Logpoint_StealerMalwareFamilies_2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--aa99d075-7455-49bb-badb-6300ffe9265f","references":[{"source_name":"Cyfirma_Vidar_June2024","description":"CYFIRMA. (2024, June 3). Vidar Stealer: An In-depth Analysis of an Information-Stealing Malware. Retrieved August 13, 2026.","url":"https://www.cyfirma.com/research/vidar-stealer-an-in-depth-analysis-of-an-information-stealing-malware/"},{"source_name":"Logpoint_StealerMalwareFamilies_2024","description":"Khadgi, N. (n.d.). A Comprehensive Overview on Stealer Malware Families. Retrieved August 25, 2026.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20240517205011/https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/logpoint-etpr-a-comprehensive-overview-on-stealer-malware-families-1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S9051","name":"The Gentlemen Ransomware","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051","kind":"malware","description":"[The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) has copied malware executables, such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).exe, to the local `C:\\Temp` directory.(Citation: MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026)(Citation: CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026)(Citation: CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026) [The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) had also enabled a hidden SMB share pointed at the `C:\\Temp` folder to allow anonymous access.(Citation: MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026)(Citation: CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026) [The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) has also consolidated data in `C:\\ProgramData\\data\\`.(Citation: TrendAI_TheGentlemen_Sept2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a370ba06-f0e0-49e7-a1dd-508700403bed","references":[{"source_name":"CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026","description":"Carvey, H., O'Donnell-Welch, L. (2026, May 21). The Gentlemen (Ransomware) in Disguise: Defense Evasion and other TTPs. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-gentlemen-ransomware-defense-evasion-ttps"},{"source_name":"CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026","description":"Check Point Research. (2026, April 20). DFIR Report – The Gentlemen & SystemBC: A Sneak Peek Behind the Proxy. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/dfir-report-the-gentlemen/"},{"source_name":"MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, May 28). The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor . Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/28/the-gentlemen-ransomware-dissecting-a-self-propagating-go-encryptor/"},{"source_name":"TrendAI_TheGentlemen_Sept2025","description":"Santos, J., et al. (2025, September 9). Unmasking The Gentlemen Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Revealed . Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.trendaisecurity.com/en-us/resources-insights/trendai-security-blog/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware"}]},{"id":"S9052","name":"MiniFast","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) has the ability to move data within the victim machine.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026) ","relationship_id":"relationship--d24d1525-3136-4810-a346-cd29a15dfac8","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026","description":"Check Point. (2026, May 22). Fast and Furious – Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict. Retrieved September 23, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/"}]},{"id":"S9053","name":"MiniJunk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) has the ability to move or rename files.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--766eaed1-a26a-4065-8793-17df813e9996","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/"}]},{"id":"S9058","name":"SIGHTGRAB","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9058","kind":"malware","description":"[SIGHTGRAB](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9058) has saved captured screenshots of victim devices to `C:\\Users\\Public` prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)   ","relationship_id":"relationship--c2fd10bb-db6f-4ea0-b63e-583c45eec56a","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"}]},{"id":"S9064","name":"TRUSTTRAP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9064","kind":"malware","description":"[TRUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9064) has saved stolen credentials in a cleartext file.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--b36109ad-fa2c-4e63-9460-1250053ae821","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"}]},{"id":"S9065","name":"DCSYNCER.SLICK","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065","kind":"malware","description":"[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has staged stolen credentials in hard-coded local device paths to include `C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\` and `C:\\users\\public\\`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf3bdeb7-2728-4bae-a790-6aa2dbf766e8","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)","relationship_id":"relationship--ec6a8fde-702a-4e38-a37b-428a8ca10b18","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft SIR Vol 19","description":"Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.","url":"http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0022","name":"APT3","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.(Citation: aptsim)","relationship_id":"relationship--87ddc052-0933-4722-9fb2-4653c4a3663c","references":[{"source_name":"aptsim","description":"valsmith. (2012, September 21). More on APTSim. Retrieved September 28, 2017.","url":"http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/09/more-on-aptsim.html"}]},{"id":"G0027","name":"Threat Group-3390","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--1b45f3b5-b7a4-4424-a8ff-1b1f1c1a55d9","references":[{"source_name":"SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"}]},{"id":"G0030","name":"Lotus Blossom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030) has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--4e956278-89d6-45b5-a7e3-2ad13ae07e01","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco LotusBlossom 2025","description":"Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lotus-blossom-espionage-group/"}]},{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)","relationship_id":"relationship--5f055076-79d1-44e8-95cb-43fc515df2f6","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster Loaders","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165631/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Loaders-Installers-and-Uninstallers-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0035","name":"Dragonfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has created a directory named \"out\" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)","relationship_id":"relationship--e15a2065-49a7-435f-b9ad-b45c4906aa74","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA18-074A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"}]},{"id":"G0040","name":"Patchwork","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--40082714-cb19-482f-9b6d-22031ef39926","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017","description":"Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0045","name":"menuPass","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--bbd29878-c16a-45ee-9785-78550f080d83","references":[{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0053","name":"FIN5","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053) scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--2af3c673-c0c6-4246-aacc-984eb370e7b9","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016","description":"Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.","url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has used C:\\Windows\\Debug and C:\\Perflogs as staging directories.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--b7d36798-e9f2-4474-836e-80b100a561e6","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Periscope March 2018","description":"FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"},{"source_name":"CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021","description":"CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a"}]},{"id":"G0069","name":"MuddyWater","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's `%temp%` folder.(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ecbd739-f0c0-4aff-858f-255e3afeee8f","references":[{"source_name":"Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022","description":"Malhortra, A and Ventura, V. (2022, January 31). Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables. Retrieved June 22, 2022.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/01/iranian-apt-muddywater-targets-turkey.html"}]},{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has staged files in a central location prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026)(Citation: MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--4618019f-219d-4a50-be6b-434568bd97d0","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 16). Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/04/16/dissecting-sapphire-sleets-macos-intrusion-from-lure-to-compromise/"},{"source_name":"MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"}]},{"id":"G0087","name":"APT39","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has utilized tools to aggregate data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--a538c673-e7f2-4fd0-923e-d874a3f3d363","references":[{"source_name":"FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020","description":"FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/public-intelligence-alert.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0090","name":"WIRTE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has staged collected documents of interest in `C:\\Users\\Public folder`.(Citation: Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--492ee8f7-6f00-43a9-ae9b-fbf57879c49e","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025","description":"Unit 42. (2025, December 11). Hamas-Affiliated Ashen Lepus Targets Middle Eastern Diplomatic Entities With New AshTag Malware Suite. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hamas-affiliate-ashen-lepus-uses-new-malware-suite-ashtag/"}]},{"id":"G0093","name":"GALLIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--a68d8191-b374-4741-a249-1db3515d581b","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers"}]},{"id":"G0094","name":"Kimsuky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has staged collected data files under <code>C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\System\\Ole DB\\</code>.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has also gathered data in structured directories prior to exfiltration under the %TEMP% environment variable.(Citation: Aryaka Kimsuky July 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--a535c99e-66f2-47c9-aa25-352c90efd2ff","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021","description":"An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html"},{"source_name":"CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky","description":"CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a"},{"source_name":"Aryaka Kimsuky July 2025","description":"Varadharajan Krishnasamy, Aditya K Sood. (2025, July 29). From Reconnaissance  to Control: The Operational Blueprint of Kimsuky APT  for Cyber Espionage. Retrieved April 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.aryaka.com/docs/reports/aryaka-kimsuky-apt-operational-blueprint.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0102","name":"Wizard Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) has staged ZIP files in local directories such as, `C:\\PerfLogs\\1\\` and `C:\\User\\1\\` prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--97a62430-6a83-4ead-b8c7-ce47f5d0cac0","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021","description":"Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220313061955/https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-10/fin12-group-profile.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0114","name":"Chimera","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) has staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--68953f34-79e2-482a-bc9a-dbe11c2839ae","references":[{"source_name":"NCC Group Chimera January 2021","description":"Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230218064220/https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/"}]},{"id":"G0119","name":"Indrik Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) has stored collected data in a .tmp file.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5926c79d-b8a7-419a-b789-7e2ff1ee32b9","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec WastedLocker June 2020","description":"Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.","url":"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us"}]},{"id":"G0121","name":"Sidewinder","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sidewinder](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121) has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--1bf421b0-1faf-403d-a8c6-3f5eb90d7c9d","references":[{"source_name":"ATT Sidewinder January 2021","description":"Hegel, T. (2021, January 13). A Global Perspective of the SideWinder APT. Retrieved January 27, 2021.","url":"https://cdn-cybersecurity.att.com/docs/global-perspective-of-the-sidewinder-apt.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0129","name":"Mustang Panda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has stored collected credential files in <code>c:\\windows\\temp</code> prior to exfiltration. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c890e6af-c827-4369-a0f7-fb351c6b6ec5","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos"},{"source_name":"Avira Mustang Panda January 2020","description":"Hamzeloofard, S. (2020, January 31). New wave of PlugX targets Hong Kong | Avira Blog. Retrieved April 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.avira.com/en/blog/new-wave-of-plugx-targets-hong-kong"}]},{"id":"G0135","name":"BackdoorDiplomacy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c37f69b0-176a-483d-b75c-3b0c84e03276","references":[{"source_name":"ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021","description":"Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, 2021","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/"}]},{"id":"G0139","name":"TeamTNT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)","relationship_id":"relationship--52ae918a-8afe-4e67-801f-d4fabbecef77","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Talos Intelligence Group","description":"Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved August 4, 2022.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/teamtnt-targeting-aws-alibaba-2/"}]},{"id":"G1016","name":"FIN13","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN13](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016) has utilized the following temporary folders on compromised Windows and Linux systems for their operations prior to exfiltration: `C:\\Windows\\Temp` and `/tmp`.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--eb63ea0a-1d2d-4d6a-9006-a60dacc035da","references":[{"source_name":"Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022","description":"Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220105132433/https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf"},{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022","description":"Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico"}]},{"id":"G1017","name":"Volt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has saved stolen files including the `ntds.dit` database and the `SYSTEM` and `SECURITY` Registry hives locally to the `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\` directory.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--fbeb5e6c-5574-4d41-add3-01efec419ae7","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 24). Chinese Cyberespionage Group BRONZE SILHOUETTE Targets U.S. Government and Defense Organizations. Retrieved July 27, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230601025540/https://www.secureworks.com/blog/chinese-cyberespionage-group-bronze-silhouette-targets-us-government-and-defense-organizations"},{"source_name":"Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023","description":"NSA et al. (2023, May 24). People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection. Retrieved July 27, 2023.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF"}]},{"id":"G1023","name":"APT5","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023) has staged data on compromised systems prior to exfiltration often in `C:\\Users\\Public`.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--4df03f98-3c25-4772-8be5-cc1aaeff1cc9","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021","description":"Perez, D. et al. (2021, May 27). Re-Checking Your Pulse: Updates on Chinese APT Actors Compromising Pulse Secure VPN Devices. Retrieved February 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/updates-on-chinese-apt-compromising-pulse-secure-vpn-devices"}]},{"id":"G1030","name":"Agrius","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) has used the folder, <code>C:\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\s\\\\</code>, to stage data for exfiltration.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--5a3333ef-b106-42db-b0bb-46b2ac7c21b2","references":[{"source_name":"Unit42 Agrius 2023","description":"Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/"}]},{"id":"G1046","name":"Storm-1811","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Storm-1811](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046) has locally staged captured credentials for subsequent manual exfiltration.(Citation: rapid7-email-bombing)","relationship_id":"relationship--05669b75-65ea-4b30-8f97-f2c806a0703d","references":[{"source_name":"rapid7-email-bombing","description":"Tyler McGraw, Thomas Elkins, and Evan McCann. (2024, May 10). Ongoing Social Engineering Campaign Linked to Black Basta Ransomware Operators. Retrieved January 31, 2025.","url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/05/10/ongoing-social-engineering-campaign-linked-to-black-basta-ransomware-operators"}]},{"id":"G1048","name":"UNC3886","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"\n[UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) has staged captured credentials in `var/log/ldapd<unique_keyword>.2.gz`.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--4b6c887c-5fae-49d2-acf2-5922bab839dc","references":[{"source_name":"Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024","description":" Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations"}]}],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[{"id":"107706a5-6f9f-451a-adae-bab8c667829f","name":"Stage data from Discovery.bat","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml","description":"Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local file. This emulates an attacker downloading data collection tools onto the host. Upon execution,\nverify that the file is saved in the temp directory.\n","inputs":{"output_file":{"description":"Location to save downloaded discovery.bat file","type":"path","default":"$env:TEMP\\discovery.bat"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"4f27afcca59e491c73385623f4b26d35f6eb1887a044a4b04d152c7660437793"},{"id":"39ce0303-ae16-4b9e-bb5b-4f53e8262066","name":"Stage data from Discovery.sh","platforms":["linux","macos"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml","description":"Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information gathering shell script\n","inputs":{"output_file":{"description":"Location to save downloaded discovery.bat file","type":"path","default":"/tmp/T1074.001_discovery.log"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Check if curl is installed on the machine.\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"dc99ca0f7ec3c73b077dcde3220be0071f829cf68b1f45679204966e0b8e8690"},{"id":"a57fbe4b-3440-452a-88a7-943531ac872a","name":"Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml","description":"Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration. Upon execution, Verify that a zipped folder named Folder_to_zip.zip\nwas placed in the temp directory.\n","inputs":{"output_file":{"description":"Location to save zipped file or folder","type":"path","default":"$env:TEMP\\Folder_to_zip.zip"},"input_file":{"description":"Location of file or folder to zip","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1074.001\\bin\\Folder_to_zip"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"493d8277552b59efd7e2689f67741b913493e9776844709dfacb9c2e53d51e80"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1560":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1560/","T1074.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1074.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1074.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0057","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}}]}}
