{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1070.010","id":"T1070.010","name":"Relocate Malware","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/010","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"6186d35e2e1b8f6b36139272488605f65b0e11cc534f67d130dfc9c6c7671ed6","description":"Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts.\n\nRelocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)\n\nRelocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006)).","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/010","external_id":"T1070.010"},{"source_name":"Latrodectus APR 2024","description":"Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice"},{"source_name":"DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023","description":"The DFIR Report. (2023, June 12). A Truly Graceful Wipe Out. Retrieved May 31, 2024.","url":"https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1070","id":"T1070","name":"Indicator Removal","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["stealth"],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1070/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","some_candidates_require_elevation"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","File Deletion","File Metadata","File Modification","Scheduled Job Modification","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0040","name":"File Deletion","tag":"File Deletion","page":"telemetry/DC0040/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0012","name":"Scheduled Job Modification","tag":"Scheduled Job Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0012/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1070/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":20,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":6,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Conditional Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#5-conditional-anomaly"},{"title":"Drought or Silence Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#17-drought-or-silence-anomaly"},{"title":"Missing-Correspondence Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#92-missing-correspondence-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Conditional Anomaly","Drought or Silence Anomaly","Missing-Correspondence Anomaly"],"tool_tags":["CSPY Downloader","Donut","Remcos","SILENTTRINITY"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0527","name":"CSPY Downloader","page":"tools/S0527/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0695","name":"Donut","page":"tools/S0695/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","page":"tools/S0332/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","page":"tools/S0692/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":2,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0040","name":"File Deletion","page":"telemetry/DC0040/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Deletion of a file, with path and responsible process where available.","collection_focus":"Prefer Sysmon FileDeleteDetected (26) when content retention is not needed; FileDelete (23) also archives files and requires a storage/privacy plan.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","archived"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0040","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"delete","archived":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1070.010","id":"T1070.010","name":"Relocate Malware","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/010","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1070.010/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1070.010/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0439","name":"Detection of Malware Relocation via Suspicious File Movement","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--3fa3299e-a8c2-4555-890b-544314ae1e44","relationship_id":"relationship--3008ab46-7c87-49dd-9c56-aa66c54b80af","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1216","name":"Analytic 1216","guidance":"Detects the relocation of malicious executables via copy/move actions across suspicious folders (e.g., from Downloads to System32), followed by deletion of the original source or renaming to blend into legitimate binaries.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1216","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"SuspiciousTargetPathRegex","description":"Patterns like \\Windows\\*, \\System32\\*, or temp+execution directories"},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlate copy+rename+delete chains within 5-minute window"},{"field":"FileExtensionFilter","description":"Limit to .exe, .dll, .js, .bat unless context suggests otherwise"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1216","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1216","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0040","component":"File Deletion","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=23","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1216","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1216","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0040/"}]},{"id":"AN1217","name":"Analytic 1217","guidance":"Detects binary movement or copying between untrusted and trusted paths (e.g., /tmp/ → /usr/bin/ or /etc/init.d/) that may indicate persistence attempts or cleanup of origin traces.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1217","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"RelocationPathPatterns","description":"Match movement into known persistence or exclusion directories"},{"field":"BinaryEntropyThreshold","description":"Apply threshold to detect high-entropy relocations (e.g., packed malware)"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"PATH","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1217","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1217","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]},{"id":"AN1218","name":"Analytic 1218","guidance":"Detects movement of binaries to `~/Library/`, `/System/`, or app bundle locations, especially after initial execution or download from Safari or Mail.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1218","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"TargetBundlePathPattern","description":"Monitor relocation to .app/Contents/MacOS/ or ~/Library/Launch*"},{"field":"QuarantineFlagCheck","description":"Check for disappearance of com.apple.quarantine attribute post-move"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"log stream","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1218","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1218","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"file_events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1218","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1218","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]},{"id":"AN1219","name":"Analytic 1219","guidance":"Detects firmware or script relocation attempts (e.g., CLI-based `copy`, `move`, or `rename`) between temporary partitions and config startup folders on routers or switches.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1219","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"StartupConfigPath","description":"Targeted config folders like flash:/startup-config or nvram:"},{"field":"CommandPatternMatch","description":"e.g., `copy tftp flash`, `rename`, `move flash:/old.bin flash:/new.bin`"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"networkdevice:syslog","channel":"command audit","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1219","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0439#AN1219","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0040","name":"File Deletion","tag":"File Deletion","page":"telemetry/DC0040/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1070","id":"T1070","name":"Indicator Removal","page":"detections/enterprise/T1070/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S9015","name":"BRICKSTORM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9015","kind":"malware","description":"[BRICKSTORM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9015) has copied itself to the `usr/sbin/` folder.(Citation: CISA BRICKSTORM UNC5221 AR25-338A February 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--44bc8e60-84bd-4b19-8b2f-acb34c50179d","references":[{"source_name":"CISA BRICKSTORM UNC5221 AR25-338A February 2026","description":"DHS/CISA. (2026, February 11). AR25-338A: BRICKSTORM Backdoor. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/analysis-reports/ar25-338a"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1070.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1070.004/","T1036.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1036.005/","T1564.012":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1564.012/","T1204":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1204/","T1566":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1566/","T1070.006":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1070.006/","T1070.010":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1070.010/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1070.010","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0040","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"delete","archived":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}}]}}
