{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1053.002","id":"T1053.002","name":"At","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"3c58d6bb9f28ccab2a0a30436eef4200c0906d044939299382e61d204418ed29","description":"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)\n\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\n\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002","external_id":"T1053.002"},{"source_name":"rowland linux at 2019","description":"Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/"},{"source_name":"GTFObins at","description":"Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.","url":"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/"},{"source_name":"Linux at","description":"IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.","url":"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html"},{"source_name":"Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task","description":"Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10","description":"Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events"},{"source_name":"TechNet Scheduled Task Events","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"},{"source_name":"Malicious Life by Cybereason","description":"Philip Tsukerman. (n.d.). No Win32 Process Needed | Expanding the WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal. Retrieved June 19, 2024.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32#blog-subscribe"},{"source_name":"TechNet Autoruns","description":"Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"},{"source_name":"TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting","description":"Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.","url":"https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"}],"platforms":["Windows","Linux","macOS"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1053","id":"T1053","name":"Scheduled Task/Job","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["execution","persistence","privilege-escalation"],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1053/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","File Creation","File Modification","Process Creation","Scheduled Job Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0001","name":"Scheduled Job Creation","tag":"Scheduled Job Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0001/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1053/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":9,"atlas_basic":2,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Novel-Category Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#85-novel-category-anomaly"},{"title":"Phase Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#28-phase-anomaly"},{"title":"Transition Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#61-transition-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Novel-Category Anomaly","Phase Anomaly","Transition Anomaly"],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0001","name":"Scheduled Job Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0001/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a scheduled execution object, including its trigger, principal and executable action.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Other Object Access Events for Windows task creation (4698); retain task XML. For cron/systemd timers, collect scheduler definitions and change events separately.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["task_name","action","principal","schedule","program"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0001","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"task_name":"LabDailyCheck","action":"create","principal":"lab-user","schedule":"daily","program":"lab-check.exe"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1053.002","id":"T1053.002","name":"At","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows","Linux","macOS"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1053.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1053.002/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":8,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"0fcd1c79-4eeb-4746-aba9-1b458f7a79cb","title":"Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ATSvc","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"rpc_firewall","category":"application","definition":"Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with \"audit:true action:block uuid:1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b\""},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/0fcd1c79-4eeb-4746-aba9-1b458f7a79cb.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_atsvc_lateral_movement.yml","author":"Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"ace3ff54-e7fd-46bd-8ea0-74b49a0aca1d","title":"Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ITaskSchedulerService","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"rpc_firewall","category":"application","definition":"Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with \"audit:true action:block uuid:86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c\""},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/ace3ff54-e7fd-46bd-8ea0-74b49a0aca1d.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_lateral_movement.yml","author":"Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0","title":"Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"rpc_firewall","category":"application","definition":"Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with \"audit:true action:block uuid:378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f\""},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sasec_lateral_movement.yml","author":"Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"d2d642d7-b393-43fe-bae4-e81ed5915c4b","title":"Scheduled Task/Job At","status":"stable","level":"low","logsource":{"product":"linux","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/d2d642d7-b393-43fe-bae4-e81ed5915c4b.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_at_command.yml","author":"Ömer Günal, oscd.community","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d","title":"MITRE BZAR Indicators for Execution","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"zeek","service":"dce_rpc"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_execution.yml","author":"@neu5ron, SOC Prime","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"dde85b37-40cd-4a94-b00c-0b8794f956b5","title":"Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe - Zeek","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"zeek","service":"smb_files"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/dde85b37-40cd-4a94-b00c-0b8794f956b5.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_atsvc_task.yml","author":"Samir Bousseaden, @neu5rn","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00","title":"Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","service":"security","definition":"The advanced audit policy setting \"Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share\" must be configured for Success/Failure"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_atsvc_task.yml","author":"Samir Bousseaden","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"60fc936d-2eb0-4543-8a13-911c750a1dfc","title":"Interactive AT Job","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/60fc936d-2eb0-4543-8a13-911c750a1dfc.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_at_interactive_execution.yml","author":"E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0333","name":"Cross-Platform Detection of Scheduled Task/Job Abuse via `at` Utility","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ca20fecb-6b8e-49ae-9ecf-19f4edd812ad","relationship_id":"relationship--4928c2f8-a102-4a33-9543-8df8ecb8e806","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0943","name":"Analytic 0943","guidance":"Detects creation of scheduled tasks via `at.exe` or WMI `Win32_ScheduledJob` class, followed by execution of anomalous processes by svchost.exe or taskeng.exe.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0943","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TaskUser","description":"Unusual users creating jobs (e.g., non-admin accounts or service users)."},{"field":"ExecutionTimeWindow","description":"Delay between task registration and execution."},{"field":"CommandLinePattern","description":"Unexpected script or binary execution (e.g., cmd.exe /c PowerShell payload)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0001","component":"Scheduled Job Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4698","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0943","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0943","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0001/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0943","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0943","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN0944","name":"Analytic 0944","guidance":"Detects usage of `at` command to schedule jobs, followed by job execution and modification of job files under /var/spool/cron/atjobs.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0944","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AtJobPath","description":"Monitoring additional paths (e.g., tmp-mounted spool dirs) for modified at jobs."},{"field":"ScheduleLatency","description":"Expected delay between at job creation and execution."},{"field":"JobScriptEntropy","description":"High entropy or obfuscation in at job payloads."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0944","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0944","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"write","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0944","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0944","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]},{"id":"AN0945","name":"Analytic 0945","guidance":"Detects user or root invocation of `at` command to schedule a job, followed by job execution using LaunchServices and activity in /usr/lib/cron/at.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0945","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AtPermissions","description":"Whether `at.allow` and `at.deny` are properly configured."},{"field":"ExecutionCommand","description":"Target binary executed via the at job."},{"field":"RunUser","description":"Detection of root user scheduling job with unusual command."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"process: at, job runner","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0945","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0945","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"fs:fsusage","channel":"file access to /usr/lib/cron/at and job execution path","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0945","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0945","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"process_events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0945","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0333#AN0945","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0001","name":"Scheduled Job Creation","tag":"Scheduled Job Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0001/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0110","name":"at","page":"tools/S0110/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0488","name":"CrackMapExec","page":"tools/S0488/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1053","id":"T1053","name":"Scheduled Task/Job","page":"detections/enterprise/T1053/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0110","name":"at","page":"tools/S0110/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0488","name":"CrackMapExec","page":"tools/S0488/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0110","name":"at","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110","kind":"tool","description":"[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.(Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at)","relationship_id":"relationship--d4d35e55-6a09-47ef-8de5-160468276025","references":[{"source_name":"TechNet At","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). At. Retrieved April 28, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx"},{"source_name":"Linux at","description":"IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.","url":"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html"}]},{"id":"S0233","name":"MURKYTOP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0233","kind":"malware","description":"[MURKYTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0233) has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--a5f43f22-7157-4e5a-8d08-d700471f1993","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Periscope March 2018","description":"FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"}]},{"id":"S0488","name":"CrackMapExec","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488","kind":"tool","description":"[CrackMapExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488) can set a scheduled task on the target system to execute commands remotely using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: CME Github September 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--54b3abf5-bc7c-4e8a-b51d-058cc313a3c9","references":[{"source_name":"CME Github September 2018","description":"byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.","url":"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/wiki/SMB-Command-Reference"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0026","name":"APT18","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026) actors used the native [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.(Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)","relationship_id":"relationship--67f19627-27a5-4898-bab5-7b235aa4ad77","references":[{"source_name":"Dell Lateral Movement","description":"Carvey, H.. (2014, September 2). Where you AT?: Indicators of lateral movement using at.exe on Windows 7 systems. Retrieved January 25, 2016.","url":"http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"}]},{"id":"G0027","name":"Threat Group-3390","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) actors use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install [HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) or [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) on other victims on a network.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)","relationship_id":"relationship--17594ffb-af22-4cdc-8849-ca31d2019a9e","references":[{"source_name":"Dell TG-3390","description":"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage"}]},{"id":"G0060","name":"BRONZE BUTLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) has used [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--9ef58dda-688d-4461-b5fc-25f2ba3a9c54","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. In Linux environments, users account-level access to <code>[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)</code> can be managed using <code>at.allow</code> and <code>at.deny</code> files. Users listed in the at.allow are enabled to schedule actions using at, whereas users listed in at.deny file disabled from the utility.","relationship_id":"relationship--be34e043-48a0-4192-a877-e8520a2800cc","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)","relationship_id":"relationship--e23ce4ac-b82c-4af1-9545-2bb237a03ed1","references":[{"source_name":"TechNet Scheduling Priority","description":"Microsoft. (2013, May 8). Increase scheduling priority. Retrieved December 18, 2017.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn221960.aspx"}]},{"id":"M1028","name":"Operating System Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1028","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl</code>. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task) ","relationship_id":"relationship--1fdd8726-606a-482d-b371-044eea79be29","references":[{"source_name":"TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task","description":"Microsoft. (2012, November 15). Domain controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks. Retrieved December 18, 2017.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj852168.aspx"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit) Windows operating system also creates a registry key specifically associated with the creation of a scheduled task on the destination host at: Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tree\\At1. (Citation: Secureworks - AT.exe Scheduled Task) In Linux and macOS environments, scheduled tasks using <code>[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)</code> can be audited locally, or through centrally collected logging, using syslog, or auditd events from the host. (Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)","relationship_id":"relationship--3e76b11e-8a9e-4300-b9d4-8cbd8e8bb37f","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks - AT.exe Scheduled Task","description":"Carvey, H.. (2014, September). Where You AT?: Indicators of Lateral Movement Using at.exe on Windows 7 Systems. Retrieved November 27, 2019.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems"},{"source_name":"Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux","description":"Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.","url":"https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/"},{"source_name":"Powersploit","description":"PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.","url":"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"}]}],"candidates":[{"id":"4a6c0dc4-0f2a-4203-9298-a5a9bdc21ed8","name":"At.exe Scheduled task","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.yaml","description":"Executes cmd.exe\nNote: deprecated in Windows 8+\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn at.exe and create a scheduled task that will spawn cmd at a specific time.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"f4f58408cb84b97d6ed98a709f52c43950cd3665995cb0f9ebf5ae60ab713583"},{"id":"7266d898-ac82-4ec0-97c7-436075d0d08e","name":"At - Schedule a job","platforms":["linux"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.yaml","description":"This test submits a command to be run in the future by the `at` daemon.\n","inputs":{"time_spec":{"description":"Time specification of when the command should run","type":"string","default":"now + 1 minute"},"at_command":{"description":"The command to be run","type":"string","default":"echo Hello from Atomic Red Team"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"The `at` and `atd` executables must exist in the PATH\n"},{"description":"The `atd` daemon must be running\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"48dd15ed57912e86d570407166e0ade37dd93c8ea470d14ae10a1c4808fbdaee"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1053.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1053.005/","T1047":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1047/","T1053.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1053.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1053.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0001","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"task_name":"LabDailyCheck","action":"create","principal":"lab-user","schedule":"daily","program":"lab-check.exe"}}]}}
