{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1048.001","id":"T1048.001","name":"Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"9ab4054a4024d9436ebf8275e0cccf09c186d78041f4cd7d84e0f68ad5b604be","description":"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nSymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data.(Citation: Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol)\n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001","external_id":"T1048.001"},{"source_name":"Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","description":"STARTUP DEFENSE. (n.d.). Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol. Retrieved September 2, 2026.","url":"https://www.startupdefense.io/mitre-attack-techniques/t1048-001-exfiltration-over-symmetric-encrypted-non-c2-protocol"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows","ESXi"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1048","id":"T1048","name":"Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["exfiltration"],"platforms":["ESXi","IaaS","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem","saas","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1048/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls"],"telemetry_tags":["Cloud Storage Access","Command Execution","File Access","File Creation","File Modification","Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Content","Network Traffic Flow","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0025","name":"Cloud Storage Access","tag":"Cloud Storage Access","page":"telemetry/DC0025/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1048/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":9,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["AADInternals"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0677","name":"AADInternals","page":"tools/S0677/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":4,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1048.001","id":"T1048.001","name":"Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows","ESXi"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1048.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1048.001/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":1,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"98a96a5a-64a0-4c42-92c5-489da3866cb0","title":"DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/98a96a5a-64a0-4c42-92c5-489da3866cb0.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dns_exfiltration_tools_execution.yml","author":"Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0503","name":"Behavioral Detection Strategy for Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--5d368ccf-2946-4a01-bfae-c18064b6187a","relationship_id":"relationship--56d9655a-f594-427f-b487-09f3e3d8fca3","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1389","name":"Analytic 1389","guidance":"Detects the execution of non-browser processes establishing outbound encrypted network connections using uncommon symmetric encryption protocols (e.g., AES via PowerShell or custom scripts) to alternate external destinations.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1389","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"PayloadEntropyThreshold","description":"Flag high-entropy payloads sent over unexpected protocols."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Define allowable transfer window (e.g., abnormal traffic outside business hours)."},{"field":"ExecutableAllowlist","description":"List of known-good binaries for encrypted traffic (e.g., Chrome, Outlook)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1389","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1389","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1389","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1389","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN1390","name":"Analytic 1390","guidance":"Detects command-line utilities or scripts using encryption libraries or symmetric algorithms (e.g., OpenSSL AES, GPG, Python + PyCrypto) in conjunction with outbound file transfers or traffic to external destinations.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1390","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"FileTransferIndicator","description":"Threshold for transferred data size or extension type."},{"field":"LibraryCallTracking","description":"Hooks into use of encryption libraries like `libcrypto.so`, `pycrypto`, `gpg`."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1390","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1390","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"connect","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1390","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1390","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"conn.log or flow data","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1390","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1390","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"ssl.log (for TLS handshake analysis), dns.log (tunneling indicators)","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1390","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1390","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN1391","name":"Analytic 1391","guidance":"Detects symmetric key-based encryption operations (e.g., AES via Python, AppleScript, or OpenSSL) followed by unusual outbound connections from non-browser applications or scripted tools.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1391","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApplicationProfileBaseline","description":"Expected outbound connection profiles per app."},{"field":"EncryptionRoutinePattern","description":"Indicators of manual encryption operations (e.g., script strings invoking AES)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"log stream process subsystem","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1391","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1391","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"socket_events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1391","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1391","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"log stream network activity","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1391","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1391","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN1392","name":"Analytic 1392","guidance":"Detects unexpected encrypted egress traffic from management services (e.g., hostd) or guest VMs utilizing symmetric encryption without traditional protocols (e.g., FTP with embedded AES ciphertext).","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1392","platforms":["ESXi"],"tuning":[{"field":"GuestVMExfilWatchlist","description":"VMs with data sensitivity labels or outside normal behavior."},{"field":"ServiceEgressProfile","description":"Expected egress destinations and volume for core services."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"esxi:vmkernel","channel":"egress log analysis","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1392","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1392","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"esxi:hostd","channel":"execution + payload hints","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1392","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1392","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"host switch egress data","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN1392","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0503#AN1392","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1048","id":"T1048","name":"Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol","page":"detections/enterprise/T1048/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1030","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.(Citation: TechNet Firewall Design)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf48cb46-cdff-440c-96bb-a7a8368306ca","references":[{"source_name":"TechNet Firewall Design","description":"Microsoft. (2004, February 6). Perimeter Firewall Design. Retrieved April 25, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700828.aspx"}]},{"id":"M1031","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. ","relationship_id":"relationship--51d3bdc8-5fe4-470a-9ffa-5497caf4493c","references":[]},{"id":"M1037","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. ","relationship_id":"relationship--4c8d1c47-d1a1-4117-8ba5-39296d8afe4d","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1048.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1048.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1048.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
