{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1036.012","id":"T1036.012","name":"Browser Fingerprint","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/012","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"498b5f8971add56e0a0ab31c05712ea2832cca0e4ce946aab2fdc21670d31637","description":"Adversaries may attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic by spoofing browser and system attributes like operating system, system language, platform, user-agent string, resolution, time zone, etc.  The HTTP User-Agent request header is a string that lets servers and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.(Citation: Mozilla User Agent)\n\nAdversaries may gather this information through [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) or by users navigating to adversary-controlled websites, and then use that information to craft their web traffic to evade defenses.(Citation: Gummy Browsers Targeted Browser Spoofing against State-of-the-Art Fingerprinting Techniques)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/012","external_id":"T1036.012"},{"source_name":"Mozilla User Agent","description":"MDN contributors. (2025, July 4). User-Agent header. Retrieved October 19, 2025.","url":"https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/User-Agent"},{"source_name":"Gummy Browsers Targeted Browser Spoofing against State-of-the-Art Fingerprinting Techniques","description":"Zengrui Liu, Prakash Shrestha, and Nitesh Saxena. (2021, October 19). Retrieved April 15, 2026.","url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2110.10129"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1036","id":"T1036","name":"Masquerading","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["stealth"],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1036/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","File Metadata","File Modification","Image Metadata","Process Creation","Process Metadata","Service Creation","Service Metadata"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0028","name":"Image Metadata","tag":"Image Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0028/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0034","name":"Process Metadata","tag":"Process Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0034/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","tag":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","tag":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1036/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":38,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Category-Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#86-category-combination-anomaly"},{"title":"Conditional Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#5-conditional-anomaly"},{"title":"Multivariate Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#48-multivariate-combination-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Category-Combination Anomaly","Conditional Anomaly","Multivariate Combination Anomaly"],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":2,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1036.012","id":"T1036.012","name":"Browser Fingerprint","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/012","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1036.012/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1036.012/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0898","name":"Detection of Spoofed User-Agent","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ad21a251-e824-4368-a04c-8a480ee653cc","relationship_id":"relationship--4f0c1449-c5fb-4d6d-b023-4f59f3fca8b0","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2029","name":"Analytic 2029","guidance":"Process execution without GUI context (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe) generates HTTP traffic with a spoofed User-Agent mimicking a legitimate browser. No corresponding UI application (e.g., msedge.exe) is active or in parent lineage. The User-Agent deviates from known enterprise baselines or contains spoofed platform indicators.  User-Agent strings can be gathered with API calls such as `ShellExecuteW` to open the default browser on a socket to receive an HTTP reply, or by hard coding the User-Agent string for a specific browser.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2029","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"HeaderSignatureMatch","description":"Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."},{"field":"UserAgentFingerprint","description":"Flag browser-based sessions"},{"field":"NonBrowserProcessList","description":"List of non-browser binaries expected not to initiate web requests (e.g., powershell.exe, cscript.exe)"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2029","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2029","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2029","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2029","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process","channel":"API Calls","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2029","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2029","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]},{"id":"AN2031","name":"Analytic 2031","guidance":"Detection of HTTP outbound requests with inconsistent or spoofed User-Agent headers from command-line tools (e.g., curl, wget, python requests) following interactive user shells or scheduled jobs outside of normal user session behavior.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2031","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"HeaderSignatureMatch","description":"Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."},{"field":"UserAgentFingerprint","description":"Flag browser-based sessions"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"http.log, conn.log","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2031","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2031","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"outbound connections","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2031","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2031","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2031","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2031","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2032","name":"Analytic 2032","guidance":"Observation of scripted network requests (e.g., using osascript, curl, or python) that include mismatched or spoofed browser User-Agent strings compared to the typical macOS Safari or Chrome baseline, especially when triggered by non-interactive launch agents, login hooks, or background daemons.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2032","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"UserAgentFingerprint","description":"Flag browser-based sessions"},{"field":"HeaderSignatureMatch","description":"Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"network connection events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2032","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2032","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2032","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2032","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"exec logs","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2032","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2032","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1036","id":"T1036","name":"Masquerading","page":"detections/enterprise/T1036/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0512","name":"FatDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512","kind":"malware","description":"[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--10d0c930-1470-4d2e-aff8-0bf42c42d2f0","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Dukes October 2019","description":"Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf"}]},{"id":"S9052","name":"MiniFast","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) has blended into network traffic by mimicking a Chrome browser using the following User-Agent string: `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36`.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--552ee76d-d812-49be-81b0-bf106dcda7b8","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026","description":"Check Point. (2026, May 22). Fast and Furious – Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict. Retrieved September 23, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/"}]},{"id":"S9061","name":"LIGHTRAIL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9061","kind":"malware","description":"[LIGHTRAIL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9061) has leveraged hard-coded User Agent strings to mimic legitimate browser traffic. (Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549TTPsTools_Nov2025)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--402ed1a0-f447-481a-9756-84e13ed30082","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549TTPsTools_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"},{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Review and limit the fingerprinting surface to only necessary information on each browser to make the browser less unique. For example, the available fonts may be limited to a standard font list. (Citation: W3C)","relationship_id":"relationship--964b451b-103a-4bef-9a1f-a2078cd81cf9","references":[{"source_name":"W3C","description":"W3C. (2025, September 12). Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications. Retrieved September 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.w3.org/TR/fingerprinting-guidance/"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1082":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1082/","T1036.012":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1036.012/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1036.012","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
