{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1010","id":"T1010","name":"Application Window Discovery","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"653202f74697c5795a04f6ec9e0630c4f583643c5a7d2c3cc50de03fb8924334","description":"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ([Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) to evade.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)\n\nAdversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) commands and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010","external_id":"T1010"},{"source_name":"ESET Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"},{"source_name":"Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021","description":"Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1010","id":"T1010","name":"Application Window Discovery","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1010/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1010/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":1,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669","title":"SCM Database Handle Failure","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","service":"security"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_scm_database_handle_failure.yml","author":"Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0097","name":"Detection of Application Window Enumeration via API or Scripting","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--d2daf569-4fc9-46a3-97b7-4d3d76c04a64","relationship_id":"relationship--5d3892e4-5a49-482a-929b-883fb2cdb765","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0271","name":"Analytic 0271","guidance":"Processes using Win32 API calls (e.g., EnumWindows, GetForegroundWindow) or scripting tools (e.g., PowerShell, VBScript) to enumerate open windows. These often appear with reconnaissance or data collection TTPs.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0271","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AccessedFunction","description":"Tune to focus on suspicious function calls (e.g., user32.dll!EnumWindows)."},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Detect behavior from non-interactive or low-privileged users where enumeration is uncommon."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Shorten detection scope to rapid successive window enumeration attempts."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0271","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0271","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"WinEventLog:PowerShell","channel":"EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0271","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0271","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]},{"id":"AN0272","name":"Analytic 0272","guidance":"Scripted or binary usage of X11 utilities (e.g., xdotool, wmctrl) or direct /proc/*/window mappings to discover open GUI windows and active desktops.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0272","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ExecutableName","description":"Common window management utilities can be tuned to reduce noise (e.g., xprop, xwininfo)."},{"field":"DisplayContext","description":"Restrict detection to processes executing under graphical sessions (e.g., DISPLAY=:0)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:EXECVE","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0272","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0272","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"linus:syslog","channel":"None","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0272","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0272","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]},{"id":"AN0273","name":"Analytic 0273","guidance":"Processes that utilize AppleScript, `CGWindowListCopyWindowInfo`, or `NSRunningApplication` APIs to list active application windows and foreground processes.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0273","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppleScriptTarget","description":"Tunable to ignore benign scripting like automation by known apps."},{"field":"ParentProcess","description":"Useful to suppress expected automation processes."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"None","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0273","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0273","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"process_events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0273","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0097#AN0273","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0262","name":"QuasarRAT","page":"tools/S0262/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","page":"tools/S0332/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","page":"tools/S0692/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0262","name":"QuasarRAT","page":"tools/S0262/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","page":"tools/S0332/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","page":"tools/S0692/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0012","name":"PoisonIvy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012","kind":"malware","description":"[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) captures window titles.(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)","relationship_id":"relationship--f436f533-1116-499f-b073-9cc7698e18b0","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005","description":"Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99"}]},{"id":"S0033","name":"NetTraveler","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033","kind":"malware","description":"[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context.(Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)","relationship_id":"relationship--10c6cc56-a028-4c2a-b24e-38d97fb4ebb7","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky NetTraveler","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (n.d.). The NetTraveler (aka ‘Travnet’). Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20160326004042/http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0038","name":"Duqu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038","kind":"malware","description":"The discovery modules used with [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) can collect information on open windows.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)","relationship_id":"relationship--bbc31a33-f55f-43d4-a3fd-23426c5fc638","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec W32.Duqu","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20111213083345/https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0094","name":"Trojan.Karagany","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094","kind":"malware","description":"[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) can monitor the titles of open windows to identify specific keywords.(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)\t ","relationship_id":"relationship--25bfb4d8-c401-4064-9ee4-24091cb86ba6","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks Karagany July 2019","description":"Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector"}]},{"id":"S0139","name":"PowerDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139","kind":"malware","description":"[PowerDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139) has a command to get text of the current foreground window.(Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--43d85ed6-223e-4402-bd29-be10a872359d","references":[{"source_name":"Volexity PowerDuke November 2016","description":"Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.","url":"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"}]},{"id":"S0157","name":"SOUNDBITE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0157","kind":"malware","description":"[SOUNDBITE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0157) is capable of enumerating application windows.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--b640dfee-9502-4ffb-92e4-f153f8726383","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT32 May 2017","description":"Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"}]},{"id":"S0198","name":"NETWIRE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198","kind":"malware","description":"[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) can discover and close windows on controlled systems.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--ac0b0f1f-a9c8-4890-aa2f-6012b75a9c52","references":[{"source_name":"Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020","description":"Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/"}]},{"id":"S0219","name":"WINERACK","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219","kind":"malware","description":"[WINERACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219) can enumerate active windows.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--69f45e5e-2ebe-4cce-a4cd-e1db67bdff1a","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018","description":"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt37-reaper-the-overlooked-north-korean-actor.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0240","name":"ROKRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240","kind":"malware","description":"[ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) can use  the `GetForegroundWindow` and `GetWindowText` APIs to discover where the user is typing.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT)","relationship_id":"relationship--d1285ef9-fb7b-4d9b-9915-0b033e768a52","references":[{"source_name":"Talos ROKRAT","description":"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, April 03). Introducing ROKRAT. Retrieved May 21, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/04/introducing-rokrat.html"}]},{"id":"S0260","name":"InvisiMole","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260","kind":"malware","description":"[InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) can enumerate windows and child windows on a compromised host.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018)(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--47ba2c60-f295-4a91-bcd1-ac17292f4e7e","references":[{"source_name":"ESET InvisiMole June 2018","description":"Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/"},{"source_name":"ESET InvisiMole June 2020","description":"Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0261","name":"Catchamas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261","kind":"malware","description":"[Catchamas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261) obtains application windows titles and then determines which windows to perform [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) on.(Citation: Symantec Catchamas April 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--d93fb52b-985e-4012-9b9f-8638e35c18a0","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Catchamas April 2018","description":"Balanza, M. (2018, April 02). Infostealer.Catchamas. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165711/https://www-west.symantec.com/content/symantec/english/en/security-center/writeup.html/2018-040209-1742-99"}]},{"id":"S0262","name":"QuasarRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262","kind":"tool","description":"[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) used a customized version of [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) to monitor browser windows for strings relating to specific Colombian financial institutions.(Citation: Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--ee60fb9b-b336-4919-a3fb-09d72dcd83e7","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024","description":"Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://securelist.com/blindeagle-apt/113414/"}]},{"id":"S0265","name":"Kazuar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265","kind":"malware","description":"[Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) gathers information about opened windows.(Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--afa84fd1-e910-4bc7-8270-1e9f9b02b53f","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017","description":"Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/"}]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332","kind":"tool","description":"[Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) can list all windows on victim systems.(Citation: Fortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--e678f070-2fb7-41dc-b63f-8dba148a5f97","references":[{"source_name":"Fortinet Remcos Campaign NOV 2024","description":"Zhang, X. (2024, November 8). New Campaign Uses Remcos RAT to Exploit Victims. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-campaign-uses-remcos-rat-to-exploit-victims"}]},{"id":"S0375","name":"Remexi","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375","kind":"malware","description":"[Remexi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375) has a command to capture active windows on the machine and retrieve window titles.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--b2cf2404-a612-4832-8dff-9f5572776785","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Remexi Jan 2019","description":"Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/"}]},{"id":"S0385","name":"njRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385","kind":"malware","description":"[njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) gathers information about opened windows during the initial infection.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)","relationship_id":"relationship--14a2bfd9-8be1-47f9-bced-b05ba2179eb5","references":[{"source_name":"Fidelis njRAT June 2013","description":"Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: \"njRAT\" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2013/fta-1009---njrat-uncovered-1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0409","name":"Machete","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409","kind":"malware","description":"[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) saves the window names.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) ","relationship_id":"relationship--8ab5954b-d36f-40c3-8f90-7e4862d38f43","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Machete July 2019","description":"ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0431","name":"HotCroissant","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0431","kind":"malware","description":"[HotCroissant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0431) has the ability to list the names of all open windows on the infected host.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c8a01e1c-dac0-4a47-bda3-3b5684bd3d47","references":[{"source_name":"Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020","description":"Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020.","url":"https://www.carbonblack.com/2020/04/16/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-the-evolution-of-lazarus/"}]},{"id":"S0435","name":"PLEAD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435","kind":"malware","description":"[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to list open windows on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--e98a5dc7-707a-4933-801a-b98b2e44b309","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017","description":"Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017","description":"Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/"}]},{"id":"S0438","name":"Attor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438","kind":"malware","description":"[Attor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438) can obtain application window titles and then determines which windows to perform Screen Capture on.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--0dfdfffc-2d1b-487f-91e0-66d81b185367","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Attor Oct 2019","description":"Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0454","name":"Cadelspy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0454","kind":"malware","description":"[Cadelspy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0454) has the ability to identify open windows on the compromised host.(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--13e89239-af0e-4f3c-9bb9-42b113f64873","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Chafer Dec 2015","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets"}]},{"id":"S0455","name":"Metamorfo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455","kind":"malware","description":"[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) can enumerate all windows on the victim’s machine.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--ce071226-7abc-492c-918d-96cc195f928d","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018","description":"Sierra, E., Iglesias, G.. (2018, April 24). Metamorfo Campaigns Targeting Brazilian Users. Retrieved July 30, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/metamorfo-campaign-targeting-brazilian-users.html"},{"source_name":"Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020","description":"Zhang, X. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/another-metamorfo-variant-targeting-customers-of-financial-institutions"}]},{"id":"S0456","name":"Aria-body","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456","kind":"malware","description":"[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) has the ability to identify the titles of running windows on a compromised host.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5ab058a1-4c88-481f-a7a8-77855ee916e6","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint Naikon May 2020","description":"CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/naikon-apt-cyber-espionage-reloaded/"}]},{"id":"S0531","name":"Grandoreiro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531","kind":"malware","description":"[Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) can identify installed security tools based on window names.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5adc78d2-a013-4a4e-afda-9a7dd38fb5fa","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"}]},{"id":"S0650","name":"QakBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650","kind":"malware","description":"[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) has the ability to enumerate windows on a compromised host.(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--e2a901d9-61a4-49df-8441-3ae622879cdf","references":[{"source_name":"ATT QakBot April 2021","description":"Morrow, D. (2021, April 15). The rise of QakBot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-rise-of-qakbot"}]},{"id":"S0673","name":"DarkWatchman","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--42c6147c-8626-4ea1-bc69-7b35ea69e2ed","references":[{"source_name":"Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021","description":"Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"}]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692","kind":"tool","description":"[SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) can enumerate the active Window during keylogging through execution of `GetActiveWindowTitle`.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--d80a85fa-5261-4274-b50e-bb82461562af","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019","description":"Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.","url":"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY/tree/master/silenttrinity/core/teamserver/modules/boo"}]},{"id":"S0696","name":"Flagpro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696","kind":"malware","description":"[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can check the name of the window displayed on the system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021) ","relationship_id":"relationship--149d6bae-0322-40b2-a361-e0d94db0601e","references":[{"source_name":"NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021","description":"Hada, H. (2021, December 28).  Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022.","url":"https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hf3q/flagpro-the-new-malware-used-by-blacktech"}]},{"id":"S1044","name":"FunnyDream","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044","kind":"malware","description":"[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has the ability to discover application windows via execution of `EnumWindows`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--fde8c63b-13e7-47d0-836f-f8b5291bf2bd","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020","description":"Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1090","name":"NightClub","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090","kind":"malware","description":"[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use `GetForegroundWindow` to enumerate the active window.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--911beb36-2a36-4c26-9e0d-bea35f6497b6","references":[{"source_name":"MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023","description":"Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/"}]},{"id":"S1111","name":"DarkGate","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) will search for cryptocurrency wallets by examining application window names for specific strings.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018) [DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) extracts information collected via NirSoft tools from the hosting process's memory by first identifying the window through the <code>FindWindow</code> API function.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--36a93ca6-ad3b-468a-b5a3-d4676410ae1b","references":[{"source_name":"Ensilo Darkgate 2018","description":"Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/enter-the-darkgate-new-cryptocurrency-mining-and-ransomware-campaign"}]},{"id":"S1159","name":"DUSTTRAP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159","kind":"malware","description":"[DUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159) can enumerate running application windows.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--b62a2a23-884c-431d-9f08-911d9ba66d48","references":[{"source_name":"Google Cloud APT41 2024","description":"Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust"}]},{"id":"S1233","name":"PAKLOG","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233","kind":"malware","description":"[PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) has used `GetForegroundWindow` to access the foreground window. (Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)  [PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) has also captured text from the foreground windows.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--ca882933-d3ee-4909-ad5b-628ed7e00709","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025","description":"Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-mustang-panda-arsenal-paklog-corklog-and-splatcloak-p2"}]},{"id":"S1239","name":"TONESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1239","kind":"malware","description":"[TONESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1239) has used `GetForegroundWindow` to detect virtualization or sandboxes by calling the API twice and comparing each window handle.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)","relationship_id":"relationship--607a87a7-ecdd-4548-bca8-a8486e061395","references":[{"source_name":"2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload","description":"Nick Dai, Vickie Su, Sunny Lu. (2022, November 18). Earth Preta Spear-Phishing Governments Worldwide. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/earth-preta-spear-phishing-governments-worldwide.html"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)","relationship_id":"relationship--170e2f76-5b6a-4eee-8ea4-d1171368b4a9","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster Loaders","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165631/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Loaders-Installers-and-Uninstallers-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster Tools","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Tools Report. Retrieved March 10, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220425194457/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1001","name":"HEXANE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) has used a PowerShell-based keylogging tool to capture the window title.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--e8713274-bcbc-4c18-bf06-2c2a0c01d2ba","references":[{"source_name":"SecureWorks August 2019","description":"SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19 ","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign"}]},{"id":"G1017","name":"Volt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"\n[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has collected window title information from compromised systems.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--bc681eea-c32c-4cc1-80a6-efd759da8bb9","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024","description":"CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[{"id":"fe94a1c3-3e22-4dc9-9fdf-3a8bdbc10dc4","name":"List Process Main Windows - C# .NET","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1010/T1010.yaml","description":"Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated with each process.\n\nUpon successful execution, powershell will download the .cs from the Atomic Red Team repo, and cmd.exe will compile and execute T1010.exe. Upon T1010.exe execution, expected output will be via stdout.\n","inputs":{"input_source_code":{"description":"Path to source of C# code","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1010\\src\\T1010.cs"},"output_file_name":{"description":"Name of output binary","type":"string","default":"%TEMP%\\T1010.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"T1010.cs must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_source_code})\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"bce6289901c398352f5706f81ea98a0aa353d257e0035773200c64ed18129cd6"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1518.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1518.001/","T1059":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1059/","T1106":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1106/","T1010":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1010/","T1113":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1113/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1010","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}