{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1001.002","id":"T1001.002","name":"Steganography","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"72205e3bae48f10c749073ea80e7864038d98fa98b153c65d8bac33b9942c4af","description":"Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002","external_id":"T1001.002"},{"source_name":"University of Birmingham C2","description":"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.","url":"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows","ESXi"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1001","id":"T1001","name":"Data Obfuscation","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["command-and-control"],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1001/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Content","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1001/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["evilginx2"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S9003","name":"evilginx2","page":"tools/S9003/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"File attributes such as path, size, timestamps, ownership and cryptographic hash.","collection_focus":"Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","size_bytes","sha256","owner_uid"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1001.002","id":"T1001.002","name":"Steganography","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows","ESXi"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1001.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1001.002/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0235","name":"Detecting Steganographic Command and Control via File + Network Correlation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--0aa86929-f232-4fa7-bdc9-120f917a3509","relationship_id":"relationship--69cfcff2-7983-45fa-a24d-9b361074b4d8","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0651","name":"Analytic 0651","guidance":"Detect the creation or modification of common media file formats (e.g., .jpg, .png, .wav) following suspicious process activity like compression or encryption, especially when paired with lateral movement or exfiltration behavior.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0651","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"FileExtensionFilter","description":"Allows tuning of monitored file types (e.g., .jpg, .png, .docx)."},{"field":"PayloadEntropyThreshold","description":"Threshold for flagging potential hidden data in outbound payloads."},{"field":"ExecutionToExfilTimeWindow","description":"Time window between media creation and network transmission."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0651","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0651","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0651","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0651","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0651","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0651","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Session Transfer Content","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0651","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0651","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN0652","name":"Analytic 0652","guidance":"Unusual use of steganographic or media processing binaries (e.g., `steghide`, `ffmpeg`, `imagemagick`) followed by outbound communication to external IPs with high data output and media MIME types.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0652","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ToolNameMatch","description":"Specify which binaries to monitor (e.g., steghide, outguess)."},{"field":"OutboundTrafficPattern","description":"Adjust based on known normal file upload services."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0652","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0652","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Captured File Content","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0652","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0652","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Observed File Transfers","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0652","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0652","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"}]},{"id":"AN0653","name":"Analytic 0653","guidance":"Abnormal usage of Preview, ImageMagick, or binary editors to alter images/documents, followed by exfiltration or outbound connections with mismatched file MIME types or payload structure.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0653","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ParentProcessBaseline","description":"Allow tuning based on expected apps calling image-editing tools."},{"field":"TimeDelta","description":"Gap between file manipulation and outbound connection."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"File creation","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0653","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0653","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"process_events","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0653","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0653","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"C2 exfiltration","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0653","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0653","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN0654","name":"Analytic 0654","guidance":"Suspicious modification of file artifacts (e.g., logs, ISO templates) on ESXi datastores, followed by beaconing or POST operations to external IPs potentially hiding payloads in file-like traffic.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0654","platforms":["ESXi"],"tuning":[{"field":"FilenamePattern","description":"Tune for likely stego file names (e.g., wallpaper.jpg, template.iso)."},{"field":"UnusualDestinationIP","description":"Destination outside vCenter management subnet."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"esxi:vmkernel","channel":"Storage access and file ops","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN0654","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0654","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"esxi:hostd","channel":"Service initiated connections","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN0654","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0654","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Transferred file observations","platforms":["ESXi"],"analytic_id":"AN0654","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0235#AN0654","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","page":"tools/S0633/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[{"id":"38602f432e5c","title":"Lab Architecture — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-02","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c.md","source_sha256":"51e18974e1481d1b83f58c3bff3a997c21e58fd027e2a159389ace500f2bc289","tool_ids":["S0633"]},{"id":"91339316f0df","title":"Attack Playbook — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-04","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df.md","source_sha256":"9b81bd1fd3daa8174dfb523b4b050f4710e62a9ce176029571975b56f6d246a0","tool_ids":["S0633"]}]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","page":"tools/S0633/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[{"id":"38602f432e5c","title":"Lab Architecture — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-02","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c.md","source_sha256":"51e18974e1481d1b83f58c3bff3a997c21e58fd027e2a159389ace500f2bc289","tool_ids":["S0633"]},{"id":"91339316f0df","title":"Attack Playbook — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-04","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df.md","source_sha256":"9b81bd1fd3daa8174dfb523b4b050f4710e62a9ce176029571975b56f6d246a0","tool_ids":["S0633"]}]}],"software":[{"id":"S0037","name":"HAMMERTOSS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0037","kind":"malware","description":"[HAMMERTOSS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0037) is controlled via commands that are appended to image files.(Citation: FireEye APT29)","relationship_id":"relationship--34c4b497-00e3-415c-8e09-3b73667d9bbe","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT29","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/rpt-apt29-hammertoss-stealthy-tactics-define-en.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0038","name":"Duqu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038","kind":"malware","description":"When the [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) command and control is operating over HTTP or HTTPS, Duqu uploads data to its controller by appending it to a blank JPG file.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)","relationship_id":"relationship--c0905059-1f3c-414c-8027-b8ec2e4b3c89","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec W32.Duqu","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20111213083345/https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0187","name":"Daserf","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187","kind":"malware","description":"[Daserf](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187) can use steganography to hide malicious code downloaded to the victim.(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a566127b-1d88-4b38-84dd-4686e2837399","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017","description":"Chen, J. and Hsieh, M. (2017, November 7). REDBALDKNIGHT/BRONZE BUTLER’s Daserf Backdoor Now Using Steganography. Retrieved December 27, 2017.","url":"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/"}]},{"id":"S0230","name":"ZeroT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230","kind":"malware","description":"[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--84f88ed3-28fe-4936-8ea2-2d4f6d015c0c","references":[{"source_name":"Proofpoint TA459 April 2017","description":"Axel F. (2017, April 27). APT Targets Financial Analysts with CVE-2017-0199. Retrieved February 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts"},{"source_name":"Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017","description":"Huss, D., et al. (2017, February 2). Oops, they did it again: APT Targets Russia and Belarus with ZeroT and PlugX. Retrieved April 5, 2018.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx"}]},{"id":"S0395","name":"LightNeuron","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395","kind":"malware","description":"[LightNeuron](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395) is controlled via commands that are embedded into PDFs and JPGs using steganographic methods.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--4be17eba-9ee0-46ff-b019-ce32c25ad146","references":[{"source_name":"ESET LightNeuron May 2019","description":"Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0495","name":"RDAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495","kind":"malware","description":"[RDAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495) can process steganographic images attached to email messages to send and receive C2 commands. [RDAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495) can also embed additional messages within BMP images to communicate with the [RDAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495) operator.(Citation: Unit42 RDAT July 2020)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--a760c63f-6459-430d-88ce-291513c47d11","references":[{"source_name":"Unit42 RDAT July 2020","description":"Falcone, R. (2020, July 22). OilRig Targets Middle Eastern Telecommunications Organization and Adds Novel C2 Channel with Steganography to Its Inventory. Retrieved July 28, 2020.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/oilrig-novel-c2-channel-steganography/"}]},{"id":"S0559","name":"SUNBURST","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559","kind":"malware","description":"[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020)(Citation: Symantec Sunburst Sending Data January 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--f01cbea5-8528-45e8-afdf-d1f382980d8a","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020","description":"FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"},{"source_name":"FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020","description":"Stephen Eckels, Jay Smith, William Ballenthin. (2020, December 24). SUNBURST Additional Technical Details. Retrieved January 6, 2021.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/sunburst-additional-technical-details.html"},{"source_name":"Symantec Sunburst Sending Data January 2021","description":"Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, January 22). SolarWinds: How Sunburst Sends Data Back to the Attackers. Retrieved January 22, 2021.","url":"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/solarwinds-sunburst-sending-data"}]},{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633","kind":"tool","description":"[Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) can encode binary data into a .PNG file for C2 communication.(Citation: GitHub Sliver HTTP)","relationship_id":"relationship--41b7f3d7-b42e-4301-ac9e-ecad27e826a0","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub Sliver HTTP","description":"BishopFox. (n.d.). Sliver HTTP(S) C2. Retrieved September 16, 2021.","url":"https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/wiki/HTTP(S)-C2"}]},{"id":"S0672","name":"Zox","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672","kind":"malware","description":"[Zox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672) has used the .PNG file format for C2 communications.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)","relationship_id":"relationship--4ae58878-d6b9-4f0d-bca1-f2f3b5e2adce","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta-Axiom","description":"Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1141","name":"LunarWeb","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141","kind":"malware","description":"[LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) can receive C2 commands hidden in the structure of .jpg and .gif images.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--06f14692-8825-4947-9a63-fb4b4384b7ed","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024","description":"Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/"}]},{"id":"S1142","name":"LunarMail","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142","kind":"malware","description":"[LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) can parse IDAT chunks from .png files to look for zlib-compressed and AES encrypted C2 commands.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--bf50a79a-2df0-4da5-86bd-b534c5c09494","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024","description":"Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0001","name":"Axiom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) has used steganography to hide its C2 communications.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)","relationship_id":"relationship--0c393451-a750-4c8a-81be-4d0e9e84a6eb","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta-Axiom","description":"Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1031","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. ","relationship_id":"relationship--c2097180-b02f-4ffc-b0a6-8e8bb899a551","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"04bb8e3d-1670-46ab-a3f1-5cee64da29b6","name":"Embedded Script in Image Execution via Extract-Invoke-PSImage","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml","description":"This atomic test demonstrates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography, where a PowerShell script is concealed within an image file. \nThe PowerShell script is embedded using steganography techniques, making it undetectable by traditional security measures. The script is hidden \nwithin the pixels of the image, enabling attackers to covertly transfer and execute malicious code across systems.\n\nThe test begins by ensuring the availability of the malicious image file and the Extract-Invoke-PSImage script. The test proceeds to extract the hidden \nPowerShell script (decoded.ps1) from the image file using the Extract-Invoke-PSImage tool. The extracted script is then decoded from base64 encoding and saved as a \nseparate PowerShell (textExtraction.ps1). Consequently, the textExtraction.ps1 script is executed.\n\nIn the case of this atomic test, the malicious image file which is downloaded has the powershell command Start-Process notepad embedded within in base64. This\nis done to emulate an attackers behaviour in the case they were to execute malware embedded within the image file. \n","inputs":{"image_file":{"description":"Malicious Image file which will be downloaded","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1001.002\\bin\\evil_kitten.jpg"},"psimage_script":{"description":"Extract-Invoke-PSImage Script downloaded","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\ExternalPayloads\\Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Image file must exist\n"},{"description":"Extract-Invoke-PSImage must exist\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"bae371e19b02d30d4c02cfb9a8e0d9c077b790d93f6d4301a6f08310e6a39901"},{"id":"4ff61684-ad91-405c-9fbc-048354ff1d07","name":"Execute Embedded Script in Image via Steganography","platforms":["linux"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml","description":"This atomic test demonstrates the execution of an embedded script in an image file using steganography techniques. The script is first encoded in base64 and then embedded within the pixels of the image. The modified image is created, and the script is extracted and executed on the target system.","inputs":{"script":{"description":"Shell Script file to be embedded and executed","type":"String","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder/script.sh"},"evil_image":{"description":"The modified image with embedded script","type":"String","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder/evil_image.jpg"},"image":{"description":"Image file to be embedded","type":"String","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder/image.jpg"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"6489b951f8ab8b61da319769923ff56908a646dcb9993eeba09843f0f9fd1d9a"},{"id":"c7921449-8b62-4c4d-8a83-d9281ac0190b","name":"Steganographic Tarball Embedding","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":3,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml","description":"This atomic test, named \"Steganographic Tarball Embedding\", simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography by embedding a tar archive file (tarball) \nwithin an image.\n\nThe test begins by ensuring the availability of the image file and the tarball file containing data . It then generates random passwords and saves them to a \nfile. Subsequently, the tarball file is created, containing the passwords file. The test executor command reads the contents of the image \nfile and the tarball file as byte arrays and appends them together to form a new image file. This process effectively embeds the tarball \nfile within the image, utilizing steganography techniques for data obfuscation.\n\nThis atomic test simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography, enabling attackers to clandestinely transfer files across systems undetected. \nBy embedding the tarball file within the image, adversaries can obscure their activities, facilitating covert communication and data exfiltration.\n","inputs":{"image_file":{"description":"Image file which will be downloaded to be used to hide data","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1001.002\\bin\\T1001.002.jpg"},"tar_file":{"description":"Tarz file containing random passwords","type":"path","default":"$env:PUBLIC\\Downloads\\T1001.002.tarz"},"new_image_file":{"description":"new image file ready for extraction","type":"path","default":"$env:PUBLIC\\Downloads\\T1001.002New.jpg"},"passwords_file":{"description":"Text file containing random passwords","type":"path","default":"$env:TEMP\\random_passwords.txt"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Image file must exist\n"},{"description":"File to hide within tarz file must exist\n"},{"description":"Tarz file to embed in image must exist \n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"cbc398c67d9e1fe79bd8e53de75bb0081f2ce7c81110f1db3826599d11bad6f6"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1001.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1001.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1001.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
