- AN0240 · Analytic 0240 — Defender observes execution of commands like `tasklist`, `sc query`, `reg query`, or PowerShell WMI/Registry queries targeting known backup products (e.g., Veeam, Acronis, CrashPlan). Behavior often includes parent-child lineage involving PowerShell or cmd.exe with discovery syntax, and enumeration of services, directories, or registry paths tied to backup software.
- AN0241 · Analytic 0241 — Defender observes use of CLI tools (`find`, `grep`, `ls`, `dpkg`, `rpm`, `systemctl`, `ps aux`) to discover backup agents or config files (e.g., rsnapshot, duplicity, veeam). This often includes command lines that recursively search `/etc/`, `/opt/`, or `/var/` directories for keywords like `backup`, and parent-child relationships involving shell or Python scripts.
- AN0242 · Analytic 0242 — Defender detects execution of `mdfind`, `launchctl`, or GUI-based enumeration (e.g., `/Applications/Time Machine.app`) along with command-line usage of `find`, `grep`, or `system_profiler` to identify installed backup tools like Time Machine, Carbon Copy Cloner, or Backblaze. Often triggered from Terminal sessions or within post-exploitation scripts.
Backup Software Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486). Commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), `reg query` with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), `dir` with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.(Citation: Symantec Play Ransomware 2023)
Open in the interactive knowledge mesh
Detection overview
Use the published detection strategies below and validate required telemetry in the target environment.
Observed groups
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
OSINT & Reconnaissance · tactic-route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · tactic-route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · tactic-route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.